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INTRODUCTION

Over the years, considerable legal scholarship has focused on the
liabilities of corporate boards of directors. 1 The composition and procedures of corporate boards, and innumerable proposals to reform the
same, have spawned countless books and articles. 2 No doubt recent cor-

I. See, e.g., DENNISJ. BLOCKETAL., l THE BUSINESSJUDGMENTRULE:FIDUCIARY
DUTIES
OF CORPORATEDIRECTORS(5th ed. 1998); Norwood P. Beveridge, Jr., The Corporate Director's
Fiduciary Duty of Loyalty: Understanding the Sel/Interested Director Transaction, 41 DEPAULL.
REV. 655 (1992); Michael Bradley & Cindy A. Schipani, The Relevance of the Duty of Care Standard in Corporate Governance, 75 IOWAL. REV. I (1989); Stuart R. Cohn, Demise of the Director's
Duty of Care: Judicial Avoidance of Standards and Sanctions Through the Business Judgment Rule,
62 TEX. L. REV. 591 (1983); Alfred F. Conard, A Behavioral Analysis of Directors' Liability for
NegUgence, 1972 DUKEL.J. 895 (1972); Melvin A. Eisenberg, The Duty o.fCare of Corporate Directors ond Officers, 51 U. PITT. L. REV.945 (1990); Charles Hanson, The ALI Corporate Governance Project: Of the Duty of Care and the Business Judgment Rule, a Commentary, 41 Bus. LAw
1237 ( 1986); Peter Letsou, Implications of Shareholder Divers[fication on Corporate Law and Organization: The Case of the Business Judgment Rule, 77 CHI.-KENTL. REV. 179 (2001) ; Harold
Marsh, Jr., Are Directors Trustees? Conflict of Interest and Corporate Interest Transactions and the
ALi's Principles of Corporate Governance, 61 GEO. WASH.L. REV. 954 (1993); Edward B. Rock &
Michael L. Wachter, lslandr of Conscious Power: Law, Norms, and the Set/Governing Corporation, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1619 (2001 ); Larry D. Soderquist, The Proper Standard for Director 's Negligence Liability, 66 NOTREDAMEL. REV.37 (1990). l confess I have contributed my small share to
the literature treating corporate directors primarily as a target for legal liability. See, e.g., FRANKLIN
A. GEVURTZ,CORPORATION
LAW, §§ 4.1-4.4 (2000); Franklin A. Gevurtz, The Business Judgment
Rule: Meaningless Verbiage or Misguided Notion?, 67 S. CAL. L. REV.287 (1994).
2. See, e.g., ROBERTA.G. MONKS& NELL MINOW,CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE
203-10 (2d
ed. 2001); AMERICANLAW INSTITUTE,
PRINCIPLES
OF CORPORATEGOVERNANCE:
ANALYSISAND
RECOMMENDATIONS
§§ 3.02, 3A.01-3A.05 (1994) [hereinafter PRINCIPLESOF CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE];
MELVINA. EISENBERG,THE STRUCTUREOF THE CORPORATION
149-85 (I 976);
Robert W. Hamilton, Cmporate Governance in America 1950-2000: Major Changes but Uncertain
Benefits, 25 J. CORP. L. 349 (I 999); Sanjai Bhagat & Bernard Black, The Uncertain Relalionship
Between Board Composition and Firm Pe1formance, 54 Bus. LAW. 921 (1999); Laura Lin, The
Effectiveness of Outside Directors as a Corporate Governance Mechanism: Theories and Evidence,
90 Nw. U. L. REV. 898 (I 996); Charles M. Elson, The Duty of Care, Compensalion, and Stock
Ownership, 63 U. CIN. L. REV. 649 ( 1995); ABA Committee on Corporate Laws, Corporate Direc-
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porate scandals will once again produce the question "Where were the
directors? " and lead to still more lawsuits against directors , and more
calls for reform. 3 Yet, given the constant interest in, and litany of complaints about, corporate boards, perhaps more scholars should ask why
corporation laws in the United States, and, indeed, around the world,
generally call for corporate governance by or under a board of directors. 4
After all, there are other governance models for a business. 5
This Article seeks to add to the literature on why boards exist.
Moreover, it does so by taking a very different approach in searching for
an answer. Instead of theorizing, this Article examines historical sources
in order to look at how and why an elected board of directors came to be
the accepted mode of corporate governance. The story of how and why
corporate boards arose turns out not only to be interesting in its own
right, but it shows that the original purpose for having boards was quite
different from the purposes argued based upon current economic and organizational theory. This insight, in tum, may help explain the frustrating dissonance between what corporate law currently expects of boards,
and what boards, in fact, do.
This examination of the historical and political origins of the corporate board of directors will proceed in four parts. To provide a starting
point against which to address the history of corporate boards, Part II of
this Article explores the current puzzle presented by the board of director 's Guidebook, 49 Bus . LAW. 1243 (1994); Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier Kraakman , Reinventing
the Outside Direclor: An Agenda/or Institutional Investors, 43 STAN. L. REV. 863 (1991 ); Arthur J.
Goldberg , Debate on Outside Directors, N.Y. T IMES, Oct. 29, 1972, at I.
3. See, e.g., Doug las M . Branson, Enron- When All Systems Fail: Creative Des/ruction or
Roadmap to Corporate Governance Reform?, 48 V!LL. L. REV. 989, 1014-2 1 (2003) ; Jame s D. Cox,
Managing and Monitoring Coriflicts of Interest: Empowering the Outside Directors with independ ent Counsel, 48 V!LL. L. REV. 1077, 1093-95 (200 3); Charles M. Elson & Christopher J. Gyves, The
Enron Failure and Corporate Governance Reform, 38 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 855 (2003); Luca
Enriques, Bad Apples, Bad Oranges: A Comment from Old Europe on Post-Enron Corporate Governance Reforms, 38 WAKE FORESTL. REv. 911 , 927-32 (2003); Jeffrey N. Gordon, What Enron
Means for the Management and Control of the Modern Business Cmporalion: Some Initial Reflections, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1233, 1234-35 (2002); Klaus J. Hop!, Modern Company and Capilal Market Problems: improving European Corporate Governance After Enron (ECG[ , Working Paper No.
05(2002, 2002) .

4. For a discussion of the leading scholarship addressing this subject, see infra text accompanyi ng notes 6-7, 15.
5. See, e.g., REV'D UN!F. P'SH!P ACT§ 401(1) (2001) (prov iding for equa l partner rights in
the mana geme nt of a partne rship); Uniform Partne rship Act§ 18(e) (1914 ) (providing for governance of a partnership by all partn ers in the absence of agree ment to the contrary); UN!F. LTD. P'SH!P
ACT, Prefatory Note (2003) (purpose of the new Uniform Limited Partner ship Act is to provide a
form of business for peopl e who want strong central management, strongl y entrenched , and passive
investo rs wi th little con trol). See also infra text accom pan ying notes 70- 72 (showing that boards
com monl y do not do much to govern corporatio ns anyway).
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tors as an institution. The puzzle arises because of a clash between the
model of the corporate board as the supreme body elected by the shareholders to ensure governance of the company on the shareholders' behalf, and the reality of the minor role that corporate boards actually play
in the governance of most companies. With this background in place,
Part III of this Article traces the historical roots of corporate boards. This
will entail a reverse chronological tour all the way back to the antecedents of today's corporate board in fourteenth through sixteenth century
companies of English merchants engaged in foreign trade. In Part IV,
this Article turns from when and how corporate boards developed, to address the underlying concepts and purposes behind the adoption of the
antecedents of today's corporate boards. This part shows how the antecedents of today's corporate boards found their genesis in the political
theories and practices of medieval Europe that, although hardly democratic, often called for the use of collective governance by a body of representatives. Finally, this Article concludes in Part V with some thoughts
as to what this history tells us about the role and purpose of a corporate
board. Specifically, the historical and political origins of the corporate
board suggest that the current frustration with corporate boards may
arise from confusing an institution of political legitimacy with goals of
business efficiency.
II.

A.

THE CURRENT PUZZLE OF CORPORA TE BOARDS

The Board-Centered Model of Corporate Governance

American corporation statutes provide, with minor variations in
language, that a corporation shall be managed by or under the direction
of its board of directors. 6 This board-centered model of corporate governance is not only the universal norm in American corporate law, it is
7
also the prevailing model of corporate governance around the world.

6. See. e.g., MODEL.BUS.CORP.ACT§ 8.01 (2002) ; DEL.GEN. CORP.LAW.§ 141(a).
ANDTHE
7. See, e.g., RICHARDM. BUXBAUM& KLAUSJ. HOPT, LEGALHARMONIZATION
BUSINESSENTERPRISE:CORPORATEAND CAPITALMARKETLAW HARMONI
ZATIONPOLICYIN
EUROPEAND THE U.S.A. 182-84 (1988) (describing the role of boards of director s in Europe);
Christopher L. Heftel, Sun,ey, Corporate Governance in Japan: The Position of Shareholders in
Publicly Held Corporations, 5 U. HAW. L. REV. 135, 138-40, 153-54 (1983) (explaining the Japanese requirement that each stock company have at least three directors); Howard Gensler, Company
Formation and Securities Listing in the People's Republic of China, 17 Hous. J. INT'L L. 399, 42021 (1995) (discussing the requirements for boards in China). An important caveat to this statement
comes from the German two-tier board model under which there is both a supervisory board and a
management board. See Thomas J. Andre, Jr. , Some Reflections on German Corporate Governance:
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Yet, viewed in a literal and narrow manner, to say that a corporation
shall be managed by or under the direction of a board of directors does
not say that much. After all, someone must manage a corporation. The
substance of this model of corporate governance comes from three underlying concepts. These concepts involve the relationship of the directors to the shareholders, the relationship of the directors to each other,
and the relationship of the directors to the corporation's executives.
The first underlying coP..ceptof the board-centered model of corporate governance is that shareholders elect (normally annually) the directors.8 To see the significance of this concept, one can compare it with
other models. Under the partnership law default rule, the owners of the
firm (the partners), simply by virtue of being owners, manage the partnership.9 By contrast, the corporation's owners (the shareholders), by
virtue of being shareholders, have no right to manage the corporation. '0
Their only right is to elect directors, and to vote on matters the directors
submit (either under compulsion of statute' 1 or voluntarily 12) for shareholder approval. Another extremely common governance model in partnerships, and in other non-corporate forms of business, 13 is for an
agreement among the owners to specify who shall be the managers of
the business. 14 Yet another scheme would be management by a self-

A Glimpse at German Supervisory Boards, 70 TUL. L. REV. 1819, 1823-26 ( 1996). For a discussion
of how and why the corporate board of directors spread around the world, see Franklin A. Gevurtz,
The European Origins and Spread of the Corporate Board of Directors, 33 STETSONL. REV. 925
(2004).
8. See, e.g., MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT§ 8.03(c); DEL. GEN. CORP. LAW§ 21 l(b). An important exception to the world-wide acceptance of thi s concept is the German invented system of codetermination , under which employees elect up to half of the corpora tion 's directors. See Klaus J.
Hop!, New Ways in Corporate Governance: European Experiments with labor Representation on
Corporate Boards, 82 MICH. L. REV. 1338, 1346 (1984).
9. See, e.g. , REV'D UNIF. P'SHIP ACT§ 401(£) (1997); UNIF. P'SHIP ACT§ 18(e) (1914).
I 0. See FRANKLINA. GEVURTZ,CORPORATIONLAW § 3. l.3a (2000).
11. See, e.g., MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT§ l l .04(b) ( 1994) (requiring sha reholder approval for a
merger); DEL. GEN. CORP. LAW§ 25l(c) (2001) (same) .
12. As , for example, when directors submit conflict-of-interest transactions for shareholder
approval. See, e.g., MODEL B us. CORP. ACT § 8.63(d) (2002) (dealing with the impact of shareholder approva l in conflict-of-interest transactions); DEL. GEN. CORP. LAW § 144(a)(2) (2001)
(same).
13. And often attempted in derogation of the board-centered model of governance in corporations as well. See discussion infi'a Parts II.A. , 11.B.2.
14. See, e.g. , FRANKLINA. GEVURTZ, BUSINESSPLANNlNG 239, 245-46 (2d ed. 1995) (discussing and giving examples of agreements designating managing partners or managers of an LLC).
The traditional limited partnership encompasses this approach as part of its basic governance model.
In this model, some owners (general partners) manage and face unlimited liability, while other own ers (limited partners) agree to relinqui sh a role in management in exc hange for limited liability. See
UNIF. LTD. P'SHIP ACT§ 303(a) (2003).
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perpetuating oligarchy of managers. 15 The corporate scheme of periodic
elections is obviously different, in theory if not in fact, from contractually designated or self-perpetuating managers .
The second concept underlying the board-centered model of corporate governance is that a group composed of peers acting together makes
the decisions. Again, the significance of this concept becomes clear if
one compares it to other governance schemes. Many businesses have
one person who single-handedly makes at least the ultimate decisions. 16
By contrast, the historic rule, and still prevailing norm, is that corporate
boards consist of more than one director. 17 As businesses or other organizations grow, group decision-making commonly replaces the solitary decision-maker. Nevertheless, this is often a hierarchical group. 18 In
such a group, all members might have input, and the group often strives
toward consensus, but, at least as a legal matter, one person has the ultimate power to make the decision. 19 By contrast, the corporate board
norm is that all directors have an equal vote, and majority rule prevails
in the event of differences. 20 Another alternative, often employed in conjunction with hierarchical group decision-making, is to subdivide authority among individuals. 21 By contrast, the longstanding corporate Jaw rule
is that directors lack any authority to act as individual directors ; rather,
the directors only have authority when they act as a group through board
meetings.22
15. Many Dutch corporations follow this scheme (except insofar as qualified by the right of
employees to object to the labor representatives selected by the board). See JESSE H. CHOPERET AL.,
CASESANDMATERIALS ONCORPORATIONS53 (6th ed. 2004).
16. This , of course, is the way a sole proprietorship typically operates.
17. See, e.g., MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 8.03 cmt. I (2002) (indicating that before 1969 the
Model Act required three or more directors ); Edwin J. Bradley , Toward a More Perfect Close Corporation- The Need for More and improved Legislation, 54 GEO. L.J. 1145, 1151 (1966). More
recentl y, amendment s to corporation statutes have allowed single-person boards. See MODEL Bu s.
CORP. ACT§ 8.03 (2002) ; CAL. CORP. CODE§ 212(a) ( 1990) (allowing less than three board members if the corporation has less than three shareholders).
18. See VICTOR A. THOMPSON,MODERN ORGANIZATION190 (2d ed. 1977).
19. See Alan L. Feld, Separation of Poli1ical Powers: Boundar ies or Balance?, 21 GA. L.
REV. 171, 180 ( 1986). The famous anecdote of President Lincoln and his cabinet provides an illustration. The story goes that Lincoln put a decision to his cabinet, all of whom voted no. Lincoln
voted aye. Lincoln then announced that the "ayes have it." Id.
20. See MODELBus. CORP. ACT§ 8.24(c) (2002).
2 l. Thi s, in fact, describes the typical corporate management structure below the board level.
See Robert W. Hamilton, Reliance and Liability Standards for Outside Directors , 24 WAKE FOREST
L. REV. 5, 9-J I (1989).
22. See Baldwin v. Canfield, I N.W. 261 , 270 (Minn. 1879). A minor variation on this rule
exist s under common corporate statutes which allow board action through unanimous written consent. See MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 8.21 (2002). Also, directors might be allowed to act through
committees . See MODELBUS. CORP. ACT§ 8.25 (2002).

2004]

ORJGJNS OF THE CORPORATE BOARD

95

The third concept embedded in the board-centered model of corporate governance is that the board has the ultimate responsibility for selecting and supervising the corporation's senior executives (especially its
chief executive officer). Actually, corporation statutes often allow, and a
rare corporation's bylaws might provide , for shareholder election of the
corporation's president or other senior officers. 23 Nevertheless, the
overwhelming practice is for the board to appoint the chief executive of24
ficer and other senior corporate officials. Moreover, courts have held
that arrangements, which deprive boards of the ultimate power to control
officers or other individuals in managing the corporation, violate the
statutory provision commanding that corporations be managed by or under the direction of the board. 25

B. Rationalizations for the Board-Centered Model of Corporate
Governance
Most literature dealing with the corporate board of directors takes
26
the existence of this institution as a given. Nevertheless, a number of
writers have suggested various rationales for this governance structure.
1. The Need for Central Management
A simple-minded rationale often expressed for the board-centered
model of corporate governance is that businesses with numerous owners
need "central management." 27 The basic notion is that it is impractical to
have numerous owners-especially if they own freely tradable interests-constantly meet together to make decisions for the firm. This certainly explains why firms with numerous owners might not wish to follow the partnership law default rule under which all owners participat e
in managing the firm. Indeed, writers typically list the desirability of

23. See DEL. GEN. CORP. LAW§ 142(b) (2001) (providing that officers may be appointed by
the board or as provided in the bylaws). But see MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 8.40(b) (2002) (the
board appoints officers ; albe it officers can appoint other officers if authorized by the board or bylaws).
24. See, e.g., EISENBERG,supra note 2, at 162-63 .
25. See Kennerson v. Burbank Amusement Co. , 260 P.2d 823, 823, 830-33 (Cal. Dist. Ct.
App . 1953); Long Park, Inc. v. Trenton-New Brunswick Thea tres Co. , 77 N.E.2d 633 , 635 (N.Y.
1948). See also Grimes v. Donald, 673 A .2d 1207, 1214 (De l. 1996) (acknowledging the rule, but
not finding an impermissible delegation). An obvious excep tion to this exists if the statute allows a
specific sort of arrang ement which deprives the board of authority.
26 . See generally supra notes 1-3. But see Robert A. Kessler, The Statutory Requirement of a
Board of Directors: A Corporate Anachronism, 27 U. CHI. L. REV. 696 (1960) (quest ioning the
need for a board of directors in all corporations).
27. See ROBERTc. CLARK,CORPORATE LAw § 1.2.4 ( 1986).
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central management as one reason why persons establishing a business
anticipated to have numerous owners might prefer to operate through a
corporation rather than a partnership. 28 Yet, this rationale fails to justify
most of the concepts that underlie the board-centered model of corporate
governance.
The need for central management fails to explain why shareholders
should annually elect the board. As stated above, 29 agreements governing many non-corporate business organizations with numerous owners
specify who will be in charge of the business, rather than providing for
periodic elected terms. Alternately, a self-perpetuating oligarchy would
provide for central management. More fundamentally, the need for central management does not explain why this management should take the
form of a group acting together as peers. A sole decision-maker would
provide central management. More realistically in a large business, why
not provide for decision-making through a hierarchy leading to a chief
executive officer?
2. Group Decision-making
A recent article by Stephen Bainbridge 30 moves beyond the need
for central management in asking why corporate law calls for a board,
rather than just a chief executive officer, to be at the apex of the corporation's management. He points to behavioral psychology studies which
suggest that groups, such as corporate boards, often produce better decisions than can single individuals when it comes to matters of judgment. 31
Presumably, it was not Professor Bainbridge's intent to justify all
aspects of the board-centered model of corporate governance in pointing
to better decisions from groups versus individuals. For example, he does
not explain why shareholders annually should elect the group (as opposed to some agreed designation of the managing group or the use of a
self-perpetuating oligarchy). Even as to the central thesis, however, the
question remains whether the evidence Professor Bainbridge cites to is
sufficient to establish that peer group decision-making, as contemplated
by the board-centered model of corporate governance, is superior to hierarchical group decision-making. In other words, while the multiple in28. See Thomas L. Hazen, The Decision to Incorporate, 58 NEB. L. REV. 627, 628 (1979).
29. See supra text accompanying notes 13-14.
30. Stephen M. Bainbridge, Why a Board? Group Decisionmaking in Corporate Governance,
55 VAND. L. REV. I (2002).
31. The notion that groups might reach better decisions than individuals is hardly new or
unique to corporate law scholarship. Proponents of the jury system often point to this rationale. See
Michael J. Saks, Book Review: Blaming the Jury, 75 GEO. L.J. 693, 706-07 (1986) (reviewing Valerie P. Hans & Neil Widmar'sJudging the Jury (1986)).

2004]

ORIGINS OF THE CORPORATE BOARD

97

put found in groups often leads to superior decisions than made by a single individual, it is less clear from experimental studies of group decision-making whether this requires the group to act as peers, with
disagreements ultimately resolved by majority rule, rather than as a
"cabinet" to a single person who has the final say. This is not an abstract
quibble, since most observers of the large corporation assert that the
predominant decision-making mode, in reality, is hierarchical group decision-making. 32 Indeed, even the sort of fundamental strategic decisions
normally thought of as within the board's purview , in fact, typically are
made by a group consisting of the chief executive officer and the senior
executives in charge of the major divisions or responsible for key functions.33 To the extent directors, as such, provide input for such decisions,
this commonly occurs through informal conversations with a few more
34
influential members of the board, rather than at a board meeting. Later,
this Article shall address why, in a publicly held corporation, hierarchical group decision-making tends to replace peer group decision-making
regardless of existence of a corporate board- thereby rendering this attempt to justify boards rather theoretical. 35
3. Representation of Corporate Constituents and Mediating
Claims to Distributions
Yet a different explanation for the use of corporate boards focuses
on the need to mediate the competing claims of those who have an interest in distributions from the corporation. Proponents of this explanation
vary in terms of which claimants the board exists to mediate between ,
and whether the need for a board arises from the desirability of the various claimants having representation on the decision -making body, or the
need for a decision-making body to be independent from the various
claimants.
Probably the most traditional variation of this rationale suggests
that boards exist so that large shareholders 36can elect themselves or their
nominees as directors in order to protect their interests in distributions.
Empirical support for this variation purportedly arises out of a recent
32. See Eisenberg, supra note 2, at 140-41.
33. See Interview with John Scriven, former General Counsel of The Dow Chemical Corporation (Oct. 8, 2002).
34. See Bayless Manning, The Business Judgment Rule and the Director's Duty of Atte ntion:
Time/or Reality, 39 Bus . LAW. 1477, 1483 (1984).
3 5. See infra text accompanying notes 68-79.
36. A shareholder with only a small percentage of the outstanding stock lacks the power, even
with techniques such as cumulative voting, to elect oneself or one's nominee to a corporate board.
See GEVURTZ,supra note I, at § 5.2.1 a.
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study conducted by Morten Bennedsen of Denmark. 37 Professor Bennedsen attempted to look at the motives for using boards of directors by
studying a large sample of Danish firms formed as anpartsselskaber (an
"AN"). The Danes modeled this business form on the German GmbH. 38
Danish law does not require ANs to possess a board of directors, but,
nevertheless, Professor Bennedsen's study of such firms found that a little less than one-fifth of his sample used a board governance structure,
including more than half of the firms with three to five owners, and twothirds of the firms with more than five owners. Based upon highly indirect statistical evidence, 39 Professor Bennedsen argues that a motive for
using boards in the closely held companies he studied was to protect
non-controlling shareholders from exploitation by controlling shareholders, particularly in regard to distributions from the company.
It is impossible to assess Professor Bennedsen's study without
much more information about the specific control arrangements in the
firms he studied. It is true that boards provide a means by which noncontrolling owners might obtain some say in firm management, including regarding corporate distributions. Nevertheless, the traditional wisdom from the experience of closely held corporations in the United
States is that the board-centered model of corporate governance is far
more likely to allow controlling shareholders to exploit non-controlling
shareholders, than are other modes of management, such as provided by
the partnership default rules, or might be found in a well-drafted share4
holders agreement. Consider , for example, the impact of the underlying
concept of the board-centered model of corporate governance that the
shareholders periodically elect the directors. This has been a recipe for
controlling shareholders to bounce non-controlling shareholders off of
the board of closely held corporations whenever controlling shareholders
feel like squeezing non-controlling shareholders out of any say in corpo-

°

37. Morten Bennedsen , Why Do Firms Have Boards ? (SSRN, Working Paper available on the
SSRN database, 2002), available at http://ssm.com/abstra ct=30368 0.
38. Id at 5 n.2. "GmbH" is short for Gesellschaft mil beschriinkter Hajiung, which means
company with limited liability. Henry P. De Vries & Friedrich K. Juen ger, limited Lia bility Contract: The GmbH, 64 COLUM.L. REV. 866, 867 (1964). The basic idea is to allow limited liability,
but without all the requirements imposed on pub licly held corporations. See id at 867-68.
39. Professor Bennedsen draws inferences regarding the probable motives for use of boards
from certain statistical correlations (as, for example, the relationship between the dispersion of stock
and the use ofa board). The validity of these inferences is well beyond the scope of this Article.
40. See F. HODGE O'NEAL & ROBERTTHOMPSON,O'NEAL'S OPPRESSIONOF MrNORITY
SHAREHOLDERS:
PROTECTING
MINORITYRJGHTSIN SQUEEZE-OUTS
ANDOTHERINTRACORPORAT
E
CONFLICTS§ 2.10 (2d ed. 1996).
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rate govemance. 41Of course, there are mechanisms, to which all parties
can agree before any dissension , for ensuring non-controlling shareholders remain on the board. 42 By comparison, however , even without special preplanning, partnership law ensures all owners a say in management , since (barring other agreement) partners, simply by virtue of being
partners, are entitled to participate in managing a partnership. 43 Moreover, even if non-controlling shareholders remain on the board, the underlying concept that corporate boards act by majority rule (as opposed
to following an advance agreement, as in a partnership contract) serves
to allow the majority shareholders in a closely held corporation to gain
disproportionate distributions at the expense of non-controlling shareholders.44 Again, there are agreements that shareholders can make before
dissension, through which minority shareholde rs can protect their rights
to distributions from the corporation. 45Yet, such agreements act in derogation of the concept that the board, acting through majority rule, manages the corporation. Indeed, in earlier years , courts often struck down
such agreements for this reason. 46By contrast , the laws governing partnerships and other non-corporate business forms, not only contemplate,
47
but encourage , agreements with respect to distributions and the like.
A broader variation of this sort of rationale asserts that boards exist
to mediate claims not just among shareholders, but also between shareholders and other corporate constituencies, such as managers, other employees, creditors, and perhaps even the community at large. While
strains of this notion go back in the United States at least to the famous
48
Berle-Dodd debate in the pages of the Harvard Law Review, a recent

41. See Wilkes v. Springside Nursing Home, Inc., 353 N.E.2d 657, 659 (Mass. 1976) (holding
the majority shareholders breached their fiduciary duty to the minority shareholder).
42. See GEVURTZ,supra note 14, at 477-87.
43. See supra text accompanying note 9.
44. See. e.g., Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co ., 328 N.E.2d 505, 520 (Mass. 1975) (but holding the majority shareholders breached their fiduciary duty to the minority share holder).
45. See GEVURTZ, supra note 14, at 477-87 .
46. See, e.g., McQuade v. Stoneham, 189 N.E. 234, 236 (N.Y. 1934). Corporat e law now generally allows such agreements .
47. See, e.g., Franklin A. Gevurtz, Squeeze-outs and Freeze-outs in Limited Liability Companies, 73 WASH. U. L.Q. 497, 504-05, 508-09 (1995). This discussion suggests that maj ority or controlling shareholder s might actually prefer board governance . Yet, if the majori ty or controlling
shareholders desire to cut off the minority from either d istributions or a voice in running the business, a system under which owners , by majority vote, dictate distributions and elect senior officers
to run the corporation (as in Wilkes v. Springside Nursing Home, Inc., 353 N.E.2d 657, 659 (Mass .
1976)) would accomplish the majority or controlling shareholders' objective even without a board.
48. See E. Merrick Dodd, Jr., For Whom Ar e Corporate Managers Trustees?, 45 HARV. L.
REV. 1145 (1932); A.A. Berle, Jr., For Whom Corporate Managers Are Trustees: A Note, 45 HARV.
L. REV. 1365 (l 932).
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article by Lynn Stout49 attempts to find empirical evidence that shareholders grant power to the board for this reason. In this modem iteration ,
the argument is that various groups-equity investors, lenders, managers, other employees , and the like-all make contributions necessary to
corporate revenues, and all expect some distribution from those revenues. Indeterminacy in the ultimate value of all these contributions toward producing revenue makes it extraordinarily difficult to come up
with ex ante contracts that will adequately compensate, but not overcompensate, each claimant. This, in tum, suggests the need for a mediating body with the power to make ex post decisions about distributions.
Professor Stout argues that shareholder acquiescence in devices, such as
poison pills, that insulate boards from shareholder control evidence that
shareholders themselves have concluded that boards exist for this purpose.
The question of whether directors should have either a duty or a
right to look out for the interests of contributors to the corporate enterprise other than the shareholders (except insofar as doing so advances
the interests of the shareholders) has been a subject of considerable legal
and economic policy debate. 50 This article is not the occasion to replay
the various arguments. 51 For present purposes, it is sufficient to ask
whether the rationale that the board exists in order to mediate between
corporate constituents explains all of the attributes of the board-centered
model of corporate governance. It would if boards were composed of
representatives of the various constituents. In that event, one could understand why there should be an elected group at the apex of corporate
management. Hence, this rationale seems to explain the existence of the
supervisory board with some representatives elected by the shareholders
and other representatives elected by the workers under the German system of co-determination. 52 Yet, for the United States, and most of the
world, the board-centered model of corporate governance assumes a
board elected by the shareholders. 53 If the board is not to have elected
representatives of each of the constituencies, what is the point of having
49. Lynn A. Stout, The Shareholder as Ulysses: Some Empirical Evidence on Why Investors
in Public Corporations Tolerate Board Governance, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 667 (2003).
50. See, e.g., Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668 (Mich. 1919); Credit Lyonnais Bank
Nederland, N.V. v. Pathe Communications Corp., 1991 WL 277613 (Del. Ch. Dec. 30, 1991); ABA
Commi ttee on Corporate Laws, Other Constituencies Statutes: Potential for Confusion, 45 Bus .
LAW. 2253 (1990); Morey W. McDaniel , Stockholders and Stakeholders, 2 1 STETSONL. REV. 121
(1991).
51. For the author's view, see GEVURTZ,supra note I, at§ 4.1.5.
52. See, e.g., Hopt, supra note 8, at 1343-44.
53. See supra text accompanying notes 6-8.
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a board? Professor Stout's answer is to view the board as an independent, rather than a representative, body, perhaps in the nature of a neutral
arbiter. Still, the norm that shareholders elect the directors seems inconsistent with this rationale. After an, it is difficult to imagine that various
corporate constituencies would have designed a system in which one
body of claimants has the legal right to select whomever it desires to act
as arbiter of distributions between the claimants. 54
4. Monitoring of Management
The final rationale for the board-centered model of corporate governance represents the prevailing view. This rationale is that boards
elected by shareholders exist as a necessary tool to monitor corporate
management. 55 Typically, this view starts with the assumption that corporate hierarchy exists to gain the advantage of team production, while
minimizing agency costs (shirking and disloyalty) by having higherlevel agents monitor lower-level agents.56 The problem becomes, however, who monitors the highest level monitors. The traditional economics answer is that the shareholders, as the residual claimants, have the
best incentives to monitor the highest-level agents. 57 This answer, however, faces a practical difficulty in the publicly held corporation, since
there are too many scattered shareholders to allow for efficient monitoring directly by the shareholders. This, in tum, leads to the argument that
the corporate board, elected by the shareholders, provides a solution to
the practical difficulty of shareholders monitoring on their own behalf.58

54. Professor Stout points out that collective action prob lems effectively blunt shareho lder
contro l over the compo sition of the board in public corporations. Instead, as discussed below, management traditionally has had control over the proxy machinery and chosen the directors. See infra
text accompanying notes 63-66. Yet, this still doe s not show that boards can act as independent arbiters; even if boards in publi c corporation s may be more likel y to favor senior mana geme nt as opposed to the shareholders. Moreover , the fortuitous happenstanc e that collective action problem s
undercut the norm of shareholder se lection of directors applies only to public corporations without a
controllin g shareholder ( or controlling shareholder group). Hence , Profe ssor Stout fails to explain
the existence of boards in corpo rations other than publicly held corporations without controlling
shareholder(s). More significantly , the fact that controlling shareholders dictate the composition of
the boards in most corpora tion s fundamentally und ercuts Professor Stout 's rationalization for boards
even in publi c compa nies, since it shows that firms can and do overcome the ex ante contracting
problems between different contributors without an indepen dent mediatin g body.
55. See, e.g., PRINCIPLES OF CORPO RATE GOVERNANCE , supra note 2, at§ 3.02; EISENBERG,
supra note 2, at 169-70.
56. See Bainbridge, supra note 30, at 5-7.
57. See Armen A. Alchian & Harold Demsetz, Production , Information Costs, and Economic
Organization, 62 AM. ECON. REV. 777, 782-83 (1972).
58. See Eugene F. Fama & Michael C. Jensen, Separation of Ownership and Control, 26 J.L.
&ECON.301,3 11 ( 1983).
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The monitoring rationale provides an elegant answer to why the
shareholders should elect the board and why the board should appoint
the senior executives. Interestingly, however, the rationale does not explain the need for a board, so long as the shareholders elect whoever
stands at the apex of corporate management. In other words, one might
achieve the same monitoring effect by having the shareholders elect the
corporation 's chief executive officer. Yet, there is an even more fundamental problem with the monitoring of management rationale for the
board-centered model of corporate governance. The monitoring rationale
rests upon a rather curious assumption. The assumption is that shareholders, who are too numerous and disengaged to monitor management
on their own behalf, will become sufficiently engaged and organized to
select vigilant directors to perform the monitoring for the shareholders.

C. The Board-Centered Model Of Corporate Governance Meets
Reality
The reality of corporate governance differs in subtle, but important,
ways from a model that posits that shareholders select directors, who select and supervise senior officers, who, in tum, carry out the board's
will. The nature of this difference depends upon whether one is dealing
with a corporation with very few shareholders (a closely held corporation) or a corporation with very many shareholders (a publicly held corporation).
1. Closely Held Corporations
In closely held corporations, reality diverges from the boardcentered model of corporate governance because the shareholders, directors and officers are the same people. 59 In other words, instead of having
a large group of passive shareholders elect directors (who may or may
not be shareholders) to manage the company, in a corporation with few
shareholders, all or most of those shareholders will elect themselves as
the directors of the company . Similarly, instead of having the board select officers who may or may not be directors and shareholders, in the
closely held corporation, the shareholder-directors typically also will select themselves to be the officers. Under these circumstance s, the shareholders often simply view themselves as running the busin ess as owners-much as partners operate. As a result, having a board serves little
evident purpose.
59. See F. HODGE O'NEAL & ROBERT 8. THOMPSON, O'NEAL AND THOMPSON' S CLOSE
CORPORATIONS AND LLC S § l.9 (rev. 3d ed. 2004).
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The reaction of corporate law to the divergence between the boardcentered model of corporate governance and the realities of practice in
the closely held corporation increasingly has been to give up on any attempt to preserve the board-centered model of corporate governance as
anything other than a default rule. This is most evident in statutes that
allow shareholders in close corporations to dispense with the board. 60
Even without dispensing with the board altogether, modern corporation
statutes commonly allow shareholders to make agreements which dictate
who will be directors and what decisions the directors shall make. 61
2. Publicly Held Corporations
The divergence between the board-centered model of corporate
governance and reality in a publicly held corporation does not involve
the melding of shareholders, directors and officers into the same few
people, but, instead, involves the flow of power between these three
groups. Specifically, the board-centered model of corporate governance
perceives power to flow from shareholders, who decide who will be the
directors, to the directors, who select the corporate officers and set policy, to the officers. In large measure, the reality in the publicly held corporation has been almost the reverse. The officers, particularly the chief
executive officer , commonly decide who will be the directors and what
policies the corporation will pursue. 62 To understand why this inversion
has taken place, we need to examine the incentives which impact decision-making at the shareholder level and at the director level.
Shareholders in the publicly held corporation typically are "rationally apathetic"; in other words, the rational shareholder in a publicly held
corporation normally will conclude that it is not worthwhile to spend
much time or effort worrying about control over the corporation. 63 After
all, the cost of trying to change corporate management is quite highsince the dissatisfied shareholder must seek support from numerous scattered other shareholders-while the rewards are relatively low, since the
other shareholders will reap most of the gains. In economics lingo, there
is a huge "free rider" problem. Of course, one might respond that the
same problem exists when dealing with federal, state and local government elections. A significant difference, however, exists between the op-

60. See MODEL Bus. CORP . ACT§ 7.32(a)( 1) (2002) ; D EL. GEN. CORP. L AW § 351 (200 I).
61. See MODEL Bus. CO RP. ACT§ 7.32(a)(3) (2002); DEL. GEN. CORP. L AW§§ 2 1S(c) (validating agreements regarding who shareholder s will vo te for as direct ors). 350 (validating agreements dictatin g actions of the board ofa statutory close corporation).
62. See THOMAS L. H AZEN & F. H ODGE O'NEAL , CORPORATIONS§ 9.2 ( 1997).
63. See CHOPER ETAL., supra note 15, at 560.
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tions open to dissatisfied shareholders and the options open to dissatisfied citizens. The shareholder who is displeased with management in a
publicly held corporation can quickly and easily sell his or her shares.
This self-help remedy of selling out is often referred to as following the
"Wall Street rule." It is much less practical for the dissatisfied citizen to
pack up and move out of the jurisdiction.
Compounding the rational apathy phenomenon is the incumbent directors' control over the corporate proxy machinery . Almost invariably ,
the corporation will pay for the incumbent directors' (or their nominees')
solicitation of proxies. 64 This is certainly the case if the election is uncontested, and normally is the case even in a contested election. By contrast, challengers will need to foot their own solicitation expenses unless
(at the very least) they win. 65 This imbalance creates a significant financial disincentive for anyone to challenge the incumbent board. The end
result is that, unlike federal, state and local government elections, elections of corporate directors rarely are contested. 66
The observation that shareholders in publicly held corporations do
not really control the corporation by selecting the directors is known as
the "Berle-Means thesis" after the two professors who wrote a book in
1932 that recognized this phenomenon. 67 The discussion so far, however, only explains why shareholders do not control the composition of
the board. It does not explain why the officers do have such control, nor
have we explained why officers, rather than directors, control corporate
decisions.
To understand why officers, rather than directors, control the public
corporation , it is useful to divide directors into two types: "inside" directors and "outside" directors. "Inside" directors refers to directors who
also work full time for the corporation, in other words, directors who are
also officers. "Outside" directors refers to directors who are not full time
employees of the corporation.
A number of practical constraints traditionally have operated to
curb the control that outside directors can exercise over the corporation.
Some of these constraints are obvious. For example, outside directors
have limited time to devote to the corporation. After all, these are indi-

64. See GEVURTZ,supra note I at§ 3.J.3(b)(3).
65. See, e.g., Rosenfeld v. Fairchild Engine & Airplane Corp. , 128 N.E.2d 291, 293 (N.Y.
1955).
AND OTHERBUSINESSORGANIZATIONS
66. See MELVIN ARON EISENBERG,CORPORATIONS
336 (8th ed. 2000) (citing SEC and Georgeson & Co. data).
67. See generally ADOLFA. BERLEJR. & GARDINERC. MEANS, THE MODERNCORPORATIO
N
ANDPRIVATEPROPERTY(1932).
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viduals who, by definition, might have full time employment somewhere
else.68 Closely related to the lack of time is the quality of information
available to the outside directors in making corporate decisions. As a
practical matter, the outside directors must rely on information presented
to them by the corporation's officers when making decisions. 69 True, directors have a legal right to inspect corporate records. 70 Yet, time constraints generally render this right more theoretical than actual. Given
these constraints of time and information, the board can hardly initiate
much of any corporate strategy or decisions. Instead, the board's role
largely falls to approval of such strategies and decisions as officers bring
before the board. 71 Even in the context of approving strategies and decisions made by the corporation 's officers, however, the board's effective
control tends to be marginal. This is so not only because most corporate
decisions never come before the board, but also because a number of
factors make it a rare case in which a board will veto an action proposed
by the officers. A couple of these factors we have just seen: Lack of time
and lack of independent information make it difficult for outside directors to second guess the corporation's officers. In addition, there are
various biases that work against the outside directors second-guessing
the corporation's officers. For example, outside directors might have relationships with the corporation or its officers that would make outside
directors think twice about challenging the officers.72 Most fundamentally, however, inside directors, and particularly the chief executive officer, have controlled the corporate proxy machinery and decided who sat
on the board. 73 This may simply be the consequence of the normal tendency of those with the greater stake-in this event, the insiders whose
jobs are on the line-to be more assertive in exercising control over the
key levers of power. At any event, if the officers, especially the chief ex-

68. Among the sorts of individuals who commonly serve as outside directors on corporate
boards are chief executive officers of other companies, bankers and lawye rs. See WILLIAMA. KLEIN
& JOHN C. COFFEE, JR., BUSINESS ORGANIZATION AND FINANCE: LEGAL AND ECONOMIC
PRINCIPLES131 (8th ed. 2002). Even academics and former government officials who sometimes sit
on boards have other things to do .
69. See EISENBERG,supra note 66, at 204 .
70. See MODELBus. CORP. ACT§ 16.05(a) (2002).
71. See Manning, supra note 34, at 1483-84 .
72. The board of directors at Enron provided a good illustration of this problem. See Gordon,
supra note 3, at 1241-42.
73. See James D. Westphal & Edward J. Zajac, Who Shall Govern? CEO/Board Power,
Demographic Similarity. and New Director Selection, 40 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 60, 78 ( 1995) (de scribi ng
how powerful boards tend to appoint new directors who are demographically similar to them).
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ecutive officer, pick directors, the normal human instinct will be to select directors who are likely to defer to the officers. 74
What about the inside directors? Since they work full time for the
corporation , presumably they do not face the same time or information
constraints as the outside directors. Yet, in evaluating the ability of the
inside directors to manage the corporation in their role as directors, we
must take cognizance of the two inconsistent realms in which the inside
directors operate. As board members, the inside directors operate in what
is supposed to be a collegial decision-making process among equals,
with differences resolved, if necessary, by majority vote.75 As officers,
however, the inside directors operate in a hierarchical setting in which
the chief executive officer has the last word. Moreover, the chief executive officer traditionally has dictated the junior officers' prospects for retention and promotion. 76 Ultimately, it is probably too much to expect
that directors who are subordinate to the chief executive officer all but a
few days per year are suddenly going to switch gears and second guess
the chief executive officer at the board meeting. Instead, while subordinate officers of the corporation may have a significant voice in developing policy-i ndeed, effective chief executive officers often work by
seeking consensus, 77 and much corporate policy originates within the
various divisions 78- the input of inside directors comes in their role as
officers rather than co-equal board members. 79
All told, the result has been to reduce the board of directors to an
institution which, despite its formal role as the supreme governing body
of the corporation, in fact, does very little.80 This dissonance between the
74. See MYLESL. MACE,DIRECTORS:
MYTHANDREALITYI 08 ( l 97 l ).
75. See supra text accompanying note 30.
76. See Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Structure of Corporation Law, 89 COLUM.L. REV. 1461,
1491-92 ( 1989).
77. See lnte1view with John Scriven, supra note 33.
78. This is particularly the case in the "M-form" management stnictur c. See Oliver E. Williamson, Organization Form, Residual Claimants, and Corporate Control, 26 J.L. & ECON.35 1,
366 (1983).
79. See MACE, supra note 74, at l 19-20.
80. See, e.g., MONKS& M!NOW,supra note 2, at 209 ('The primary conclusion of this chapter
is that America's boards of directors have, more often than not, failed to protect shareholders' interests.''); Rita Kosnik, Greenmail: A Study of Board Performance in Corporate Governance, 32
ADMIN.SCI. Q. 163, 166-67 (1987) (modern board is a "co-opted appendage institution"); Myles L.
Mace, Directors: Myth and Reality-Ten Years Later, 32 RUTGERSL. REV. 293 (1979) (study reaffinned results of earlier study as to director passivity) ; MACE,supra note 74, at l 07 (sn1dy finding
that directors rarely challenged or monitored CEO performance, but often served as little more than
"attractive ornaments on the corporate Christmas tree") ; ROBERT A. GORDON, BUSINESS
LEADERSHIP
INTHE LARGECORPORATION
143 (1961) ("the board of directors in the typical large
corporation does not actively exercise an important part in the leadership function").
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expected role for the board, and the realities of corporate governance,
appears to be inherent in the nature of the institution. One piece of evidence for this conclusion comes from the fact that complaints about director inaction go back through the history of corporate boards, appearing in sources ranging from classic articles of legal scholarship,81 to
nineteenth century literature.82 Nor are such complaints limited to boards
in the United States.83 Moreover, despite claims of improvement s in corporate board governance, recent scandals again have produced complaints about passive boards. 84 Of course, the fact that large corporations
have prospered, and have contributed to modem economic prosperity,
suggests that there must be something right about the management structure of corporations-notwithstanding complaints arising from periodic
corporate meltdowns. Still, it is difficult to read the work of economic
historians without coming to the conclusion that the managerial developments which made corporations work are those- like the development
of the U-form and M-form organizational structure- that occurred below the level of the board of directors .85
8 l. See, e.g., W illiam 0 . Dougla s, Directors Who Do Not Direc1, 47 HARV. L. R EV. 1305
(1934) (po inting out in 1934 that a popu lar theme had become that director s should assume the respon sibility of directin g).
82. See, e.g., ANTHONY TROLLOPE, THE WAY WE LIVE Now 298-309 ( 1875) ("Melmotte [the
chief exec utive officer of the compan y, and perpetrator of a fraudulent promotion,] wou ld speak a
few slow word s ... always ind icative of triumph , and then everybod y would agree to everythin g,
somebody would sign something , and the board ... would be over").
83. See Corpora/e Governance in J apan : A Report by Oxford Analy tica, in MONKS &
MINOW, supra note 2, at 267 (explaining that in Japan , formal authorit y is held by the co mpany
president and the board of directors, but board meetings are infrequent and decisions are rubber
stamped; rea l autho rity is held by the president and the op erating committ ee compo sed of the pre sident's immed iate subordinates); id at 292 (explaining that the president director-ge nera l (PDG) of
French companies wields almo st uncheck ed control over the enterprise without the co unter power of
the board, whose composition and age nda the PD G contro ls; indeed, it is regarded as "'b ad manners ' for the board to vote on a manageme nt decision"); Mark J. Roe, Political Preconditions to
Separating Ownership fro m Corporate Control, 53 STAN. L. REV. 539, 568 (2000 ) (not ing that
Germa n corporate supervisory board s meet infrequentl y and their informational base has been
weak).
84. See, e.g., The Way We Govern Now, ECONOMIST, Jan . 11, 2003 , at 59 (discussing poor
board gove rnance in light of corpora te scandals invo lving Enron); Michae l C. Jensen & Josep h
Fuller , What's a Director To Do?, (Oct. 2003), at http :// ssm. com/AB STR ACT=357722 ("The recen t wave of corpora te scandals prov ides co ntinuing evidence that boards have failed to fulfill their
role as the top- level corpo rate contro l mechanism"); Gordon, supra note 3, at 1241-42 (noting that
Enron's board was a "sple ndid board on paper," but its failure revea ls a certain weakness wi th the
board as a govern ance mechanism).
85. See RICHARD S. TEDLOW,T HE RISE OF THE AMERICANBUSINESSCORPORATION 13-24 ,
56-60 ( 199 1). W hile the univers al adoption of board governance for pu blic co rporat ions makes it
difficult to perfor m an empirical study on the impact of procee ding with out a boa rd, vario us recent
studies attempt to assess the impact of board co mposition and other corpora te governance practices
on corpora te perfonna nce. Many of the results have bee n inconclusive. See Hamilt on, supra note 2,
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Given the dissonance between the norm that corporations are supposed to be managed by, or under the direction of, an elected board, and
the realities of corporate governance , it is fair to ask when and how the
norm of board governance developed. With the readers' indulgence, this
section will not address this subject by using the traditional forward narrative of a history book. Instead, it will trace the roots of corporate
boards in the manner in which the researcher discovers such thingswhich is to begin with the more recent and work one's way backwards in
time until one cannot find earlier examples of the use of corporate
boards. In other words, we will follow the method of an archeological
dig.
A. Ameri can Corporate Legislation
The norm that the ultimate power over corporate management resides in an elected board has always existed in American corporation
statutes. The law commonly considered to be the first general incorporation statute, New York 's 1811 act,86 provided that "the stock, property
and concerns of such company shall be managed and conducted by trustees, who, except those for the first year, shall be elected at such time
and place as shall be directed by the by laws of the said company .... " 87
Of course, current corporate statutes typically refer to "directors ," rath er
than "trustees," 88 attempt to recognize reality by calling for corporate
at 364-73 (studie s have not produ ced consis tent posit ive results from cha nges in corpora te gove rnance , such as increased use of independen t dire ctors); Bhaga t & Black, supra note 2, at 945 (reviewing over 100 studi es and findin g no convincin g ev idence that indepen den t director s improve firm
performan ce). Studies in les s developed economie s suggest perhaps a greater impact. See Mark Mobius, Issues in Global Corpor ate Governance, in CORPORATE GOVERNANCE:AN ASIA-PACIFIC
C RITIQUE 47-4 8 (L ow Chee Keon g ed ., 200 2) (expl aining t hat rece nt studies in emerg ing markets
sho w better stock performance of companie s with so -ca lled better corporate gov ernance, includ ing
more independ ent boards). Neverthele ss, it is diffi cult to say how muc h of this resu lt comes from
ha ving a board versus other so-called good co rporate governa nce practices, how much of impro ved
market return s reflect a current desire by inves tors for stock of companies with so- called be tter corpo rate gove rnance practic es, and how much reflect actual improved per formance by suc h corpo ration s.
86. Before New York 's statute , a coupl e of states had enacted narrow corporations laws ad dressi ng turnpikes or the like. See HARRY c. HENN & JOHN R. ALEXANDER, LAWS OF
CORPORATIONSAND OTHERB USJNESS ENTERPRISES § 12 (3d ed . 1983). For the most part, however, prior to this time , corporation s cam e into ex istence by spe cial legislation, which granted charters to individua l corpora tions. See GEVURTZ, supra note 1, at§ 1.1.3 a.
87. 18 11 N.Y. Laws LXVII.
88. See, e.g., MODEL B US. CORP. ACT§ 8.01 (20 02); DEL. GEN. CORP. LAW§ 14l(a) (200 1).
Some types of corp orations, such as mun1al associat ions, however, often still use the term trustee.
See MICH. COMP. LAWSANN. § 500.6 834 (Wes t 2002).
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management "by or under the direction of' the board, rather than "by"
the board, 89 and specify annual election by shareholders, rather than
leave this to the bylaws. 90 Still, New York's statute shows that the basic
norm of corporate board governance existed from the beginning of general incorporation laws.
The New York legislature was not being particularly creative in
providing for board governance in 1811. In fact, this provision seems
simply to have codified the common governance pattern established under the individual legislatively granted charters through which corporations had previously come into existence. 91 Take, for example, the 1791
charter of the Bank of the United States ( often known as the first Bank
of the United States92). This charter provided for a board of twenty-five
directors to be elected annually by the shareholders. 93 The bank's board,
in tum, under the charter, annually appointed one of its members to be
the bank's president, and could appoint such other officers as the board
deemed necessary. 94 This governance structure was not unique to banking. As an illustration, look at The Society for Establishing Useful
Manufactures, which received its charter from the New Jersey legislature
in 1791. Alexander Hamilton (who also had a hand in the formation of
the first Bank of the United States the same year) formed this nobly
named corporation "to produce paper, sail linens, women's shoes, brass
and ironware, carpets, and print cloth." The affairs of this corporation
were under the management of thirteen directors elected by the shareholders. Interestingly enough, the collapse of this corporation provides
an early American example of the failure of outside directors to monitor
management. 95

89. See, e.g., MODELBus. CORP. ACT § 8.0l(b) (2002); DEL. GEN. CORP. LAW § 14l(a)
(200 l ). The purpose of the "under the direction of' language is to make it clear that the statute does
not command the board to engage in day-to-day running of the corporation . See MODELBus. CORP.
ACT§ 8.0l(b) cmt. (2002).
90. See, e.g., MODELBus. CORP. ACT § 8.03(c) (2002); DEL. GEN. CORP. LAW § 21 l(b)
(2001).
91. This pattern of governance continued to be found in the special charters granted corporations even after general incorporation laws first became available. See JOSEPHK. ANGELL &
SAMUELAMES, TREATISEON THELAWOF PRIVATECORPORATION
S AGGREGATE121 (l 832).
92. The charter of the first Bank of the United States expired in 1811. A subsequent charter
created the second Bank of the United States in 1816. See MICHAEL P. MALLOY, BANK
REGULATION§ 1.3 (1999).
93. Bank Act, ch. 10, § 4 (l 791).
94. Id. §§ 4, 6.
TE LEADERSHIP:BOARDS,DIRECTORS
, ANDSTRATEGY
95. See STANLEYC. VANCE,CORPORA
3-5 (1983).
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B. English Antecedents
1. The Bank of England
Not surprisingly, the use of boards of directors by the early American corporations finds its apparent roots in similar provisions of English
corporate charters. The 1694 charter of the Bank of England provides
one of the clearest examples of English influence on American practice.
The Bank of England's 1694 charter provided for a board of twenty-four
96
directors. Indeed, this charter seems to have pioneered the term "director. "97 A "court of proprietors" (what we would now refer to as a shareholders meeting) annually elected the Bank of England's directors. 98
Several facts show the influence of this charter on American practice.
An obvious fact is the borrowing of the term "director." Another fact is
the similarity in the size of the Bank of England's twenty-four-person
board and the first Bank of the United States' twenty-five-person board
(which appears simply to have added one to the size of the English
bank's board in order to avoid tie votes). Finally, in a provision which
demonstrates influence because of its unusual nature, both the Bank of
England and the first Bank of the United States imposed term limits on
directors: The charter of the Bank of England prevented one-third of the
directors of the bank from seeking reelection, 99 while the charter of the
First Bank of the United States prevented one-quarter of the directors
from seeking reelection. 100
In one important respect, however, American charters , including
that of the first Bank of the United States, typically differed from the
governance structure used by the Bank of England. Unlike the common
American practice as embodied in the charter of the first Bank of the
United States, the charter of the Bank of England provided for election
of the bank's president by the court of proprietors , instead of appoint-

96. See Cyril O' Donnell, Origins of the Cmpo rate Executive, 26 BULL.Bus. HIST. Soc'y 55,
61 (1952).
97. See, e.g., RONALD RALPH FORMOY, THE HISTORICAL FOUNDATIONSOF MODERN
COMPANYLAW 2 1 (1923). While the 1618 charter of the Africa Compa ny called for a board of
twelve "d irectors," this terminology for board members did not catch on until the 1694 charter of
the Bank of England. See I WILLIAM ROBERT SCOTT, THE CONSTITUTION AND FINANCE OF
ENGLISH, SCOTTIS
H AND )RISH JOINT-STOCKCOMPANIESTO 1720, at 51-52 (1912); 3 WILLIAM
ROBERTSCOTT,THE CONSTITUTION
AND FINANCEOF ENGLISH,SCOTTISH ANDIRISH JOINT-STOCK
COMPANIES
TO 1720, at 205 (1912).
98. See O'Donnell, sup ra note 96, at 61.
99. See 5-6 W. & M., c. 20 (Eng.).
I 00. See Bank Act, supra note 93, at § 7(2).
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ment by the directors. 10 1 In fact, it is somewhat ironic that American
corporate governance has followed a sort of English parliamentary
model under which the board appoints the company's chief executive,
whereas early English corporations often followed a model closer to
American political practice of having the members directly elect the
company's chief executive. 102 In any event, by the cJose of the eighteenth century, the Bank of England's court of proprietors would simply
approve the "house list" of candidates for directorships prepared by the
existing directors 103-thus establishing the historical roots of the separation of ownership and control. While, in this regard, the Bank of England's practice provided an early harbinger of the divergence of the
board-centered governance model from the realities that prevail in the
publicly held corporation, in another way, the Bank of England's board
followed the model. At its inception, the Bank of England's board met
weekly to participate in running the bank, and, throughout the bank's
history, committees of Bank of England directors remained actively involved in the bank's management. 104
2. The Companies Established to Colonize America
The English corporations chartered to establish colonies in what
became the United States of America probably also influenced early
American corporations to adopt board governance. In this case, however,
the influence would have been subtler, since these companies had passed
from the scene by the time Americans formed business corporations.
Still, it is likely that the pattern of board governance established by these
colonizing companies- which continued to reverberate in the political
institutions of the thirteen states- made Americans comfortable with the
notion of corporate governing boards.
In 1606, James I granted a charter to two companies for purposes of
trade and colonization in North America. This charter granted what was
earlier referred to as the London Company, and later became known as
the Virginia Company, the right to plant a colony at any place between
the thirty-fourth and forty-first parallels, while what was typically referred to as the Plymouth Company could plant a colony between the
thirty-eighth and forty-fifth parallels. Each company consisted of certain
"knights, gentlemen, merchants and other adventurers" named in the
charter, plus any other persons whom the original members of the comIOI.
I02.
I03.
I04.

See
See
See
See

O'DonneJJ, supra note 96, at 61.
infra text accompanying note 226.
O' Donnell, supra note 96, at 62-63.
id at 61, 66.
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pany allowed to join the company. The charter provided for governance
through two types of councils. Each colony would have a local resident
council of thirteen members appointed by the king. At the same time, the
king would appoint a "Council of Virginia" of thirteen members in England for "superior managing and direction." 105 Notice that, while these
companies followed a governance model based on boards, they did not
at this point follow the model of a board elected by the members of the
company.
James I's attempt to deprive the members of the London Company
of the power to select the council, however, proved unsatisfactory in the
aftermath of the disappointing results from the Jamestown colony. As a
result, in 1609, a new charter was issued for the London Company, now
called the 'Treasurer and Company of Adventurers and Planters of the
City of London for the First Colony of Virginia ." This new charter
placed the executive power over the company in the hands of a treasurer
and deputy treasurer, 106 and also established a new governing council in
England. Significantly, the company's council was elected by the members of the company, rather than appointed by the king. 107 Membership
in the company, in tum, was available to persons who contributed
money towards the colony. 108 Hence, at this point, the London Company
had adopted common features of the board-centered model of corporate
governance. As far as local governance at the colony, the 1609 charter
eliminated the local council and provided for control by a governor appointed by the company's council in England. 109
Three years later, yet another iteration occurred in the governance
scheme for the London Company. Interestingly, the new charter issued
for the London Company in 1612 represented something of a move
away from board governance, and an additional flow of power directly
to the members of the company. The 1612 charter limited the authority
of the council, on its own, to handling "matters of less consequence and
weight as shall from time to time happen touching and concerning" the
105. 2 JOHN P. DAVIS, CORPORATIONS:
A STUDYOF THE ORIGINAND DEVELOPMENT
OF
GREATBUSINESSCOMBINATIONS
ANDOFTHEIRRELATIONTO AUTHORITY
OF THESTATE 158-59
(1905).
I 06. The odd designation of the chief executive officer as the "treasurer" suggests that the
principal contemplated focus for the company's activities involved raising and spending money in
support of the colonization.
107. See William C. Morey, The Genesis of a Written Constitution I ANN. AMER.ACAD. POL.
& Soc. SCI. 538-39 ( 1890).
I 08. The charter called for all persons who contributed money to the venture to be admitted to
membership by action of the treasurer and any three existing members. See 2 DAVIS, supra note
105, at 162.
109. See Morey, supra note 107, at 539.
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colony . To handle "matters and affairs of greater weight and importance ," such as the manner of government to be used, the disposition of
land and possessions , and the settling and establishing of trade, the 1612
charter called for quarterly assemblies comprised of the council and
members of the company sitting as one body. These assemblies , which
the charter entitled "The Four Great and General Courts of the Council
and Company of Adventurers of Virginia, " also were empowered to
elect members of the council and officers of the company . At this point,
control of the local situation at the colony lay in the hands of a governor
appointed by the assembly. 110 In the end, however, this governance
structure contributed to, or at least did not prevent , the company ' s undoing. In 1624, James I obtained the dissolution of the London Company
111
through a quo warranto proceeding.
Meanwhile, back at the Plymouth Company, the company received
a new charter in 1620 under the name "The Council established at Plymouth , in the County of Devon , for the planting, ordering , and governing of New England, in America." As suggested by this name , the membership in the company became synonymous with membership in the
governing council. 112 The charter limited membership to forty members ,
who were named in the charter and held memberships for life, and who
filled vacancies by vote of the existing members. Needless to say, this
represents a substantial deviation from the model of governance through
a board of representatives elected by the owners of the company . After
an unsuccessful effort to establish a colony at the mouth of the Kem1ebec
River in 1607, the Plymouth Company largely confin ed its activities to
granting other groups the license to establish colonies or trade in parts of
the territory to which the Plymouth Company had received the exclusive
113
rights in its charter .
While the Plymouth Company itself did little to establish the model
of corporate governance through elected boards , it indirectly played a
role in spreading this model. In 1628, John Winthrop and others secured
from the Plymouth Company a grant of land from a point three miles
north of the Merrimac River to a point three miles south of the Charles
River. The next year , after obtaining confirmation of this grant from
Charles I, Winthrop and his associates obtained a charter to form a corporation named the "Governor and Company of the Massachusetts Bay
110. See id. at 540-41 .
111. See 2 DAVIS, supra note 105, at 169 (noting that James I opposed grant s of free and popular government).
112. See id. at 170 .
113. See id. at 169-7 1.
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in New England" (typically referred to as the Massachusetts Bay Company). The governance scheme set out in the charter of the Massachusetts Bay Company borrowed from the London Company and exhibited
features of the board-centered model of corporate governance missing
from the Plymouth Company . The charter called for a governor , deputy
governor, and eighteen so-called "assistants." As we shall see later, 114
the term "assistants" is one of the earliest English designations for what
we now would call directors. The charter named the first governor, deputy governor and assistants for the Massachusetts Bay Company, but
called for the subsequent election of persons to hold these position s by
the members of the company. The charter called for at least monthly
meetings of the governor (or deputy governor) and assistants to direct
the affairs of the company. Copying from the London Company, the
charter of the Massachusetts Bay Company also called for four "great
and general courts" attended by the governor or deputy governor , at least
six assistants, and the members of the company, to take place every year.
These general courts had the power to elect officers for the company. 115
There was one key difference, however , between the governance
provisions of the charter of the Massachusetts Bay Company and the
governance provisions of the charter of the London Company from
which the Massachusetts Bay Company copied. Unlike the London
Company's charter, the charter for the Massachusetts Bay Company did
not specify that the company's general courts and council had to meet in
England. Accordingly, the members of the Massachusetts Bay Company- who were using the company structure to further a religious and
political agenda- met in Massachusetts. 116 As a result, the elected governing board of the Massachusetts Bay Company became, in effect, the
Massachusetts colonial legislature. The corporate charter for the Massachusetts Bay Company remained the governing constitution for the Massachusetts colony until 1691, when a new royal charter for the colony
replaced the Massachusetts Bay Company's corporate charter. The 1691
charter, however, preserved the existing governance structure, except
that the king thereafter appointed the colony's governor. 117
The upshot was that the Massachusetts Bay Company had even
more influence on the structure of American government than it did on
the governance of American business. The same is true of the London
Company, whose members, in 1621, adopted an "Ordinance and Consti114. See discuss ion infra Parts 111.B.3, IY .B.2 -3.
115. See 2 Davis, supra note I 05 , at 173.
116. See GEORGE CAWSTON & A.H. KEANE, THE EARLY CHA RTERED COMPANIES 210 ( 1896).
117. See Morey, sup ra note I 07, at 550.
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tution" for the government of Virginia, which, copying from their own
charter, called for the governance of the colony by a governor, council of
118
assistants, and a general assembly at the colony.
The governance
structure established by the London Company for the Virginia colony in
1621 provided the model for other colonies in Maryland and the Carolinas, while the governance structure established by the Massachusetts
Bay Company's 1628 charter provided the model for other colonies in
Connecticut, Rhode Island and New Hampshire. 119 In the end, as the
American states began to charter corporations, the notion of an elected
board may well have been comfortable because of its similarity to the
governance scheme of the state legislatures-the irony being that the
governance scheme of the state legislatures stemmed from the board
governance of the corporations formed to colonize North America.
3. The Trading Companies
While both the Bank of England, and the companies established to
colonize America , apparently influenced American acceptance of corporate board governance, it was the English trading companies that developed board governance as a model for a business corporation.
a. The Joint Stock Trading Companies
The charters of the famous English trading companies , such as the
East India Company, the Russia Company, the Eastland Company , the
Levant Company, the Hudson's Bay Company , and the South Sea Company, evidence the consistent use of governing boards. 12 For example,
at the outset of the seventeenth century, Queen Elizabeth I granted a
charter to 216 knights, aldermen and merchants to become "a body politic and corporate" by the name of the "Governor and Company of Merchants of London, trading into the East Indies." The result was to create
what came to be known as the East India Company . The East India
Company's charter committed the direction of the voyages , and the
management of all other things belonging to the company, to a governor121and twenty-four persons called "committees." Hence, the title
"committees" (like the title "assistants" encountered in the Massachusetts Bay Company) predated the title "director" or "trustee" as the label

°

118. Id. at 542.
119. Id. at 544, 550.
120. For a tabular listing of the governance structures of English joi nt stock companies until
1720, showing predominately board governance, see 3 SCOTT,supra note 97, at 462-480.
121. The chief executive offic er of such early corporatio ns commonly had the title "governor, "
rather than "president" or the more modern "CEO."
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attached to the elected members of a corporation's governing board. The
charter named Sir Thomas Smith as the first governor, but provided that
the members of the company annually would elect the committees, who
would choose from among themselves a govemor. 122
The charter of the East India Company was following wellestablished precedent in calling for the use of a governing board. In
1554, Philip and Mary granted a charter to what came to be known as
the "Russia" or "Muscovy" Company. 123 The charter named Sebastian
Cabot as governor for life, and provided for four "sad, 124 discreet and
honest" members to be consuls, 125 and twenty-four members to be assistants. Members of the Russia Company annually elected the consuls and
126
assistants. Interestingly, while most records were lost in a fire, the extant records of the Russia Company suggest a familiar deviation between
the role of the board called for in the charter of the Russia Company and
the more limited role the board actually took. For example, the members
(stockholders), acting as a whole, seem to have taken a more extensive
role in managing the company than suggested by the charter (which only
empowered the members to elect the consuls and assistants). Records
show that the members at general meetings selected "factors" (agents) to
represent the Company in Russia, approved contracts and statements of
account, and resolved disputed charges of private trading leveled against
servants of the Company. At the opposite extreme, on many occasions,
the governor, perhaps with the input of a few of the major members,
seems to have acted for the company. By contrast, despite receiving
broad powers in the charter, there is little in the records as far as actions
by the board of assistants. 127

122. See, e.g., CAWSTON& KEANE, supra note 116, at 87; O'Donnell, supra note 96, at 67.
123. The unbe lievably long and convoluted official name of this company was "The Merchants
Adventurers for the Discovery of Lands, Territories, Isles and Seigniories unknown, and not by the
Seas and Naviga tions, before this said late Adventure or Enterprise by Sea or Navigation, commonly frequented." 2 DAVIS,supra note 105, at 98.
124. Id. As in steadfast, trustworthy and wise, rather than unhappy. See THE OXFORDENGLISH
DICTIONARY2617 (1989).
125. As discussed later (see infra text accompanying note s 252-54), the title "consul" comes
from medieva l Italian municipal governments, from whence it migrated to municipal governments
elsewhere in medieval Europe. The term also migrated into Italian business-related entities when ,
for example, the organization of the Bank of Saint George in Genoa included four consuls, nominated by the chief officials, to superintend its finances. See 1 SCOTI, supra note 97, at 20.
126. See O'Donnell, supra note 96, at 60.
127. See T.S. WILLAN, THE EARLY HISTORYOF THE RUSSIA COMPANY 1553-160 3, 22-24
(1959).
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In 1579, Elizabeth I granted a charter to the "Fellowship of East128
land Merchants" (commonly referred to as the Eastland Company).
Under the charter, the government of the Eastland Company consisted of
a governor, one or more deputy governors, and twenty-four assistants .
Members of the Eastland Company annually elected the governor and
deputy governor(s), but, in an unusual provision , the assistants held of129
fice on good behavior.
The Levant Company started life with a different governance structure. This company came into official existence in 1581 when Elizabeth
I granted a charter to Sir Edward Osborn, Thomas Smith, Richard Staper
and William Garret to become "The Company of Merchants of the Levant. " The charter named Osborn as the Company's first governor , but,
with only four initial members, the charter did not reflect any need for
assistants. The charter authorized Osborn and Staper to admit up to
twelve other English subjects into the company, while the queen retained
the right to admit two more into the company. In 1592, Elizabeth I
granted a new charter to the company. This new charter named fiftythree members , and authorized the company to admit additional members without the numerical limitations of the old charter. 130With more
members , the governance structure now changed. The new charter called
not only for a governor , but also for the members to elect annually
twelve assistants. Growth in the company produced a new charter in
1605. Admission into the company was now open to all merchants upon
payment of a fee. In tenns of governance , the new charter increased the
number of assistants to eighteen. 131
English trading companies founded after the East India Compan y
also had charters calling for governing boards. For exampl e, in 1670, the
English government granted a charter creating the Hudson's Bay Company-o fficially titled "The Gov ernor and Compan y of Adventurers of
England trading into Hud son' s Bay "- for the purpo se of trade in what is
now Canada. Under the charter , the proprietors of the compan y elected
annually a governor , deputy governor, and a board of seven commit tees.132In 171 I, the infamous South Sea Compan y-o fficially nam ed
"Governor and Company of Merchant s of Great Britain Tradin g to the
South Seas and other part s of America, and for Enc ouragin g the Fish-

128. The name Eas tland comes from the English reference to the Baltic as the "Eas t Sea ."
129. See O ' Donnell, supra note 96, at 65.
130. The ex panding membersh ip apparen tly was an attempt to acco mmodate merchants whose
trade in the Medit erranean fell victim to the war w ith Spain. See I SCOTT, supra note 97, at 85.
13 1. See 2 DAV IS, sup ra note I 05 , at 90- 91.
132. See CAWSTON & KE ANE, supra no te 116, at 279-80.
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ery"-received its charter. The principal business of the South Sea
Company seems to have included equal parts holding British government debt and encouraging an ill-fated speculation in its own stock (the
so-called South Sea Bubble ). 133 The South Sea Company had a governor, sub-governor, deputy governor, and a board of thirty directors. 134
Sadly, the plea of ignorance asserted by many of the company's directors during the investigation and prosecution following the company's
collapse in 1720 135 is eerily reminiscent of the response of directors to
scandals ever since.
These English trading companies not only evidence the use of corporate governing boards going back almost half a millennia, they played
a critical role in establishing the use of boards as the governance mechanism for the business corporation. For example, the East India Company
appears to have pioneered various aspects of modem board practice . As
discussed earlier in this Article, 136 a key power of the typical modern
corporate board-which is especially important if one views the principal role of the board to be monitoring the performance of corporate management-is the power to hire and fire the chief executive officer. The
initial charter of the East India Company may have been the first (or at
least the first well documented) corporate charter to grant the power to
the governing board to elect the corporation's governor, rather than
leave this power in the hands of the company's members. 137 Interestingly, as mentioned above, 138 American corporations were quicker to
adopt this practice than other English corporations. Over the years, various further changes occurred in the governance of the East India Company, by successive charter or otherwise. For example, during the eighteenth century, the committees elected a chairman and deputy chairman
to preside over their meetings, thereby establishing an office of chair
separate from that of governor' 39-something pushed for by reformers of
boards today. 140 Another example of governance practices introduced
133. See generally EDWARDCHANCELLOR,DEVIL TAKE THE HINDMOST:A HISTORYOF
FINANCIAL
SPECULATION
ch. 3 (1999).
134. 3 SCOTT,supra note 97, at 295 -96.
135. Among the South Sea Company's thirty directors was an inner group, who were behind
, THE SOUTH
the company's fraudulent activities, and a passive outer group. See JOHNG. SPERLING
SEA COMPANY:AN HISTORICAL
ESSAYAND BIBLIOGRAPHICAL
FINDINGLIST 27 (1962) . Not surprisingly , the passive board members sought to shift the blame to the directors who were active in
the fraud. See JOHNCARSWELL,THE SOUTHSEABUBBLE230 (1960).
136. See supra text accompanying notes 23-25 .
137. O'Donnell, supra note 96, at 62.
138. See supra text accompanying notes 101-02.
139. See O' Donnell, supra note 96, at 65-66.
140. See Branson, supra note 3, at IO15.
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into the East India Company that remains common today comes from an
act of Parliament in 1773. This act introduced staggered terms to the
company 's board of what were by then referred to as directors , with one141
quarter of the directors elected every year .
The most critical innovation that occurred with these trading companies, however, did not involve a change in the structure of the governing board. Instead , it involved what was going on around the board.
These companie s were undergoing a metamorphosis from so-called
regulated companies- essentially guilds whose membership consisted of
merchants conducting independent operations under the company's
franchise-into joint stock companies, in which voting power and economic return came from investing in a common enterprise. While this
evolution did not alter the structure of the governing board , it fundamentally changed what the board was supposed to do. The board turned from
a regulatory body, which preserved an exclusive franchise on behalf of a
group of merchants who conducted individual businesses, into a supervisory body , which had overall responsibility for running a business. 142
The Eastland Company provides a good example of a regulated
company. The charter of the Eastland Company granted the merchants in
the company the exclusive right among English subjects to trade with
Scandinavia and the Baltic region (but not Russia). 143 Such exclusive
rights were typical of the English trading company charters , which attempted to carve up the world into a series of franchises . So, the charter
of the Russia Company granted the Company exclusive rights as far as
English subjects to trade in Russia, as well as in "lands of infidels " discovered by merchants in the Company. 144 The charter of the Levant
Compan y granted members of this Company exclusive trading rights
145
with Turkey. Perhaps most generous of all, the charter of the East India Company granted its members exclusive trading rights in a territory
described as encompas sing all of Africa, Asia and America from the
Cape of Good Hope to the Straits of Magellan. 146
As a regula ted company , the Eastland Company did not conduct
operations as a corporation . Instead, the merchant s who were the mem14 1. See O' Donnell. supra note 96, at 60. In one respect, the board of the East India Company
seems to have been unusual when compared with modern practice. The board purportedly met every
day during 1615 to deal with the growth of the Company's business. I SCOTT,supra note 97, at 163
( citing a resolution granting the board members a £ I 000 hono rarium).
142. See WILLAN,supra note 127, at 19-21.
143. See CAWSTON& K EANE, supra note 116, at 61.
144. See 2 DAVIS, supr a note l 05, at 98 .
145. See id. at 88 .
& KEANE, supra note 116, at 87-88.
146. See CAWSTON
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bers of the company conducted trading operations, either individually or
in ad hoc partnerships. 147This fact, in tum, leads to a critical question
from the standpoint of the history of board governance: If a regulated
company did not conduct operations as a corporation, what was the purpose of having a governing board? The answer is that the board adopted
ordinances to govern the activities of the members of the company. 148
For example, the board of the Eastland Company adopted a prohibition
on "colouring" goods. 149Colouring referred to selling goods of a nonmember merchant as a member's own. By operating in this fashion as
undisclosed principals, non-members attempted to circumvent the company's exclusive franchise. As this example illustrates, the role of a
board of a regulated company was not to have overall responsibility for
operating a business, but, rather, to impose rules on individual merchants
in order to preserve a monopoly.
The Russia Company may have been the first joint stock company.150In the joint stock company, instead of each merchant trading in
his own stock (merchandise), the merchants subscribed to a fund that financed a combined or joint stock of merchandise for trading by agents of
the company-hence, the title "joint stock company" from which derives
the current label of stockholder. 151There were a couple of motivations
for the evolution from the regulated company to the joint stock company. The obvious motivation is the greater need for financing, and
greater risk of failure, as trading voyages went from the close (the Baltic) to the far. (The members of the Russia Company originally hoped to
find a northeast passage to Asia. 152
) The joint stock principle raised more
money, and spread the risk among more participants, than did individual
operations in the regulated company. 153There may have been another
motivation. Limiting operations to trading under the company's direc-

147. See WILLAN,supra note 127, at 19-20.
148. Id at 20.
149. See, e.g., M. Schmitthoff, The Origin of the Joint-Stock Company, 3 U. TORONTOL.J. 74,
82 (1939).
150. See I SCOTT,supra note 97, J 7. The discerning reader may have noticed that the Russia
Company predated the Eastland Company, despite the fact that the Russia Company started as a
joint stock company, while the Eastland Company was a regulated company. This shows that the
evolution from regulated to joint stock companies was an erratic, rather than a linear, proce ss. Indeed, the Russia Company itself regressed into a regulated company later in its life. See inji-a note
162.
151. For a discussion of the meanings ascribed to the word "stock" in the ear ly joint stock
companies, see I SCOTT,supra note 97, at 158.
152. See id at 18.
153. See. e.g., id. at 17; Meir Kohn, Business Organization in Pre-Industrial Europe, 27,
(SSRN, Working Paper No. 03-09, 2003).
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tion financed through a joint stock fund could serve as a way to combat
,
· 154
practices
sueh as col ounng.
At its inception, the East India Company seems to have straddled
the worlds of the regulated and the joint stock companies-so much so
that historians disagree over whether the East India Company started as
a regulated company and evolved into a joint stock company, or whether
155
the East India Company was a joint stock company from the outset.
The conflict arises from the fact that the original charter of the East India
Company preserved the right of the members to trade individually under
the company's franchise, much as in a regulated company, and the fact
that not all of the members in the East India Company subscribed to the
early voyages financed on a joint stock basis. 156In any event, historians
agree that during the first half of the seventeenth century, in lieu of having permanent capital, members of the East India Company subscribed
to joint stock funds that would finance a certain number of trading voyages to India. These funds then were supposed to be wound up and the
proceeds distributed among the subscribers. In the middle of the seventeenth century, a combination of accounting confusion caused by this
system, 157 and the continuing need to justify its monopoly, 158led to a restructuring in which a permanent joint stock fund replaced the earlier
funds. 159Beyond moving to a permanent capital, two critical changes
occurred in the rights of the members-historians disagree whether these
occurred in the middle or toward the end of the seventeenth century.
Voting rights began to depend upon the amount each member invested
in the permanent joint stock, instead of being available to all members.160In addition, the company no longer granted members the right to

154. See Schmitthoff , supra note 149, at 91.
155. Compare 2 DAVIS , supra note I 05, at I I 8-19 (discussing how the East India Company
conducted voyages through individual merchants and merchant groups until 1612, when it began
trading voyages as a corporation), with SCOTT,supra note 97, at 92-101 (stating that from its inception, the East India Company conducted its voyages on a joint stock basis, even though the members
invested on a per voyage basis rather than into a permanent capital or joint stock of the company).
156. See Schmitthoff, supra note 149, at 90-91.
I 57. The confusion developed when the compa ny began to raise later joint stock funds without
winding up the earlier joint stocks. Also perplexing was how to account for the permanent facilities
the company had acquired in India and England (often referred to as "dead stock," as opposed to the
trading or "quick stock").
158. Several competing groups were able to obtain licenses from English kings to trade in the
East India Company's territory. These licenses were sometimes rationalized on the ground that the
East India Company had not made settlements or established trade as promised.
159. See 2 DA VIS, supra note l 05, at 119-22.
160. See, e.g., SCOTT,supra note 97, at 465 (noting that voting rights in the East India Company were limited in 1650 to one vote for each£ 500 contribution); 2 DAVIS supra note 105, at 129-
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trade on their own under the company's franchise. 161 The result of these
two changes was to tie the benefits of membership in the English East
India Company- both in terms of voting control and in terms of any
economic retum--entirely to a subscription into a common fund for the
company's activities, and thereby complete the transformation of the
company from a confederation of merchants into a vehicle for passive
investment by the general public. 162
The development of the joint stock company, by setting the stage
for transferable ownership interests in which voting power can depend
upon the number of interests purchased and in which voting power
might become widely dispersed among passive investors, obviously has
tremendous implications for corporate governance. It laid the groundwork for the separation of ownership from control, but also created the
ability for today's hostile takeovers. For purposes of this Article, however, dealing as we are with the historical and political origins of corporate board, the development of the joint stock company has another impact. The same board structure that existed to enact and enforce rules
governing the conduct of independent merchants in the regulated company (such as the Eastland Company) found itself pressed into service to
manage a large business venture in the joint stock company (such as the
Russia and East India Companies). This occurred without any evident
consideration as to the different nature of these tasks, or whether an institution developed for one task best fit the needs of the other function.

30 (noting that the new charte r of 1693 gave one vote in the genera l court for each£ 1000 in contribution, up to a maximum of ten votes) .
161. See, e.g., Samuel Williston, The Histo,y of the Law of Business Corporations before I 800,
in 3 SELECTESSAYSIN ANGLO-AMERICANL EGALHISTORY195, 200 (1909) (noting that members
lost the right to trade independentl y under the East India Company's franchise toward the end of the
seve nteen th centu ry); William Mitche ll, Early Forms of Partnership, in 3 SELECT ESSAYS IN
ANGLO-AMERICANLEGAL HISTORY 183, 194 ( 1909) (noting that members lost the right to trade
independently under the East India Company's franchise in 1654).
162. Interestingly enough, the Russia Com pany evo lved in the op posite direction. It started
with permanent capital, but disappointing results durin g later years led the memb ers to demand a
repayment of their cap ital. Thereafter, the company began operating throug h subscriptions and periodic redistributions. This practi ce, in tum, resulted in fewer members hav ing a greate r share in the
compa ny, and more com plaints about the co mpany 's monopoly becoming concentrated in the hands
of a few. These comp laint s, as well as the accounting confu sion resu lting from the lack of a permanent capital, finally led to the com pany becoming a regulated , instead of a joint stock, co mpany. See
WILLAN,supra note 127, at 269-73. The Levant Com pany fo llowed a somewh at similar regressio n
from joint stock to regulated company. Id. at 273.
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b. The First English Trading Companies
The use of boards of "assistants" or "committees" by the sixteenth
and seventeenth century English trading companies appears to derive
from a pattern set by two of the earliest companies of English merchants
engaged in foreign trade: The Company of the Merchants of the Staple,
and the Company of Merchant Adventurers. The history of these two organizations is even fuzzier than is the case with the joint stock and regulated corporations discussed thus far. For purposes of this Article, however, it is sufficient to focus on several facts about these two companies.
In each case, the company adopted governance by a board coupled with
a chief executive officer. Further, these two companies apparently were
the first companies of English merchants organized for foreign trade
with at least some degree of the sort of exclusive rights from the crown
that would motivate the later English trading companies to seek charters.
As such, the inevitable inference is that the board governance structure
adopted by the Company of the Merchants of the Staple and the Company of Merchant Adventurers provided the model followed by the later
English trading companies when the later English trading companies
drafted charters calling for board governance. 163 The other point worth
noting is that neither the Company of the Merchants of the Staple, nor
the Company of Merchant Adventurers, was anything remotely like a
joint stock company. Instead, these were regulated companies, like the
Eastland Company, in which the role of the board was to enact and enforce rules governing the activities of individual merchants, rather than
manage a business.
Broadly speaking, the Merchants of the Staple engaged in the export of English raw wool, while the Merchant Adventurers engaged in
the export of English cloth, as well as other English manufactured
goods. 164 The Merchants of the Staple take their name from the fixed
place (the staple) to which, at various times, English law limited all sales
of raw wool exports. 165 The system began with voluntary efforts at the

163. Reinforcing this inference are the similarities in the composition of the boards of the Merchant Adventurers and the Russia and Eastland Companies (twenty-four "assistants" in each case),
as well as the fact that many of the founding member s of the Russia Company were members of the
Merchants of the Staple or the Merchant Adventurers . WILLAN,supra note 127, at 2 1.
164. Not surprisingly , thi s demarcation between the two companies was subject to some dispute, particular ly once a decline in the wool trade motivated members of the Merchants of the Staple to sell cloth. See SIR PERCIVALGRIFFITHS,A LICENSETO TRADE: THE HISTORYOF ENGLISH
CHARTEREDCOMPANIES 10 (J 974).
165. The interest of the Merchants of the Staple in such a limitation , particularly insofar as it
could reduce com petition and allow control over prices, is obvious enough. The English kings saw
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end of the thirteenth century by Edward I to encourage all wool exports
to go through one market (first at Dordrecht and then at Antwerp). It appears that the English merchants handling these wool sales obtained a
charter from the duke of Brabant (now part of Belgium) allowing them
to hold assemblies, and, later, to elect a "mayor," in order to govern the
merchants' affairs. 166The result seemingly was to establish something of
an organized merchant society or company, but apparently with a simple
governance structure built around an executive officer and decisions by
all of the members. The staple system became compulsory in 1313, with
the establishment of a Mayor and Council of the Merchants of the Staple, who were empowered to choose a staple town for all wool exports.167 They first chose Saint-Omer (in Flanders), but tussles over
where the constantly moving staple would be, and who would be allowed to trade, occupied the next half-century. After the Ordinance of
the Staple of 1353 brought the whole thing for a few years to fifteen
English towns (each of which had its own Mayor of the Staple and supporting officers), 168the staple gravitated toward Calais (which was then
under English control). As a result, the Merchants of the Staple became
the Company of the Staple of Calais. 169Significantly for purposes of this
Article, a council of twenty-four governed the company in Calais (and,
interestingly enough, for the two years between 1363 and 1365 also gov170
erned the town). Hence, the Merchants of the Staple, to some extent as
early as 1313, and certainly by 1363, had adopted a system of board
governance.
Despite its somewhat swashbuckling sound, "merchant adventurers" was a label used by merchants who engaged in the export trade of
manufactured goods. The early history of the merchant adventurers as an
organized company is murky. English merchants trading in Antwerp obtained a pair of charters from the dukes of Brabant in the thirteenth cen tury, which allowed them to establish a mayor and a court (an assembly).171 It is unclear, however, whether the Company of Merchant

this as a device to extract revenues from the wool merchants. See EILEEN PO\VER,THE WOOL
TRADETNMEDIEVAL
HfSTORY87-90 (1941 ).
166. See id at 95-96.
, ENGLISHTRADETNTHEMIDDLEAGES,289-290 (1931 ).
167. See L.F. SALZMAN
168. See id at 293.
169. See POWER,supra note 165, at 97-99.
170. See GRIFFITHS,supra note 164, at 7. According to some historical sources, there were
initially twenty-six merchants in charge of the company at Calais, but this probably comes from
adding the two mayors (one for the company and one for the town) to the twenty-four member
council. See SALZMAN,
supra note 167, at 295.
171. See GRrFFrTHS,supra note 164, at 9.
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Adventurers, as it ultimately became known, bore enough of a relationship to these earlier expatriate English merchants to support the later
company's efforts to claim this lineage, particularly insofar as the Merchants of the Staple also laid claim to at least the later of these charters.
Early in the fifteenth century, Henry IV of England granted a charter to
English merchant exporters trading outside England (mostly in the Low
Countries), which allowed the merchants to elect a governor over themselves.172The role of the governor under the charter was to resolve disputes among the English merchants and to aid the English merchants in
their claims against foreign merchants. The governor, with the assent of
the merchants (presumably through an open assembly), could also establish ordinances for the group and impose reasonable punishments upon
merchants disobeying these ordinances. 173During the fifteenth century,
merchant exporters operating from England, unlike their countrymen
operating abroad, had no formal separate organization. Instead, many of
them apparently were members of the Mercers Company, a London
merchant's guild, where, by the middle of the century, they seem to have
begun meeting as a separate group. By the late fifteenth century, the
London merchant exporters had come to view themselves as a distinct
fellowship with the title "Merchant Adventurers," and evidently were
operating in connection with the English merchants in the Low Countries. This is evidenced by a 1485 petition to the English crown, in which
the London merchant exporters designated themselves "Merchant Adventurers, Citizens of the City of London, into the parts of Holland, Zee174
land, Brabant and Flanders ."
In 1505, Henry VII took a critical step in bringing together the merchant adventurers as a coherent company. He granted a charter to The
Company of Merchant Adventurers, giving the Company a monopoly on
trade in export of English manufactures; albeit, membership in the company had to be open to any English merchant who paid a fee. More significantly for purposes of this Article, this charter authorized the company (which would be headquartered on the Continent, rather than in
England) to elect "Four and Twenty of the most sadd [sic] discreet and
honest Persons of divers [sic] fellowships" to be "Assistants" to the
governor. 175The function of the governor and the assistants was to
resolve disputes among merchants and to enact ordinances for the
regulation of the members of the company. 176During the first half of the
172. See EDWARD P. CHEYNEY, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE INDUSTRIAL AND SOCIAL HISTORY
OF ENGLAND 165 (1901).
173. See2 DAVIS,supranote

!05,at74-75.

174. GRIFFITHS, supra note 164, at I 0.
175. See CAWSTON & KEANE , supra note 116, at 249-54 .
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the members of the company. 176 During the first half of the sixteenth
century, merchant adventurers in English cities that perhaps were jealous
of the London merchants' dominance created their own companies of
Merchant Adventurers. These companies often also employed a board
governance structure, with elected governors and twelve or eighteen as177
In 1564, however, Elizabeth I issued a new charter to the
sistants.
Merchant Adventurers. This charter confirmed governance of the company in a governor, his deputy, and, again of most significance to this
Article, twenty -four assistants, to be headquartered abroad, and who had
jurisdiction over merchant adventurers wherever they operated. 178
All told, both the Company of Merchant Adventurers and the Company of the Merchants of the Staple had governing boards whose structure matches, and evidently provided the model for, the governing
boards of trading companies , such as the Russia, Eastland, and East India, companies. As suggested by the charter of the Merchant Adventurers, the boards of the Company of Merchant Adventurers and the Company of the Merchants of the Staple existed to resolve disputes and to
pass ordinances regulating the conduct of the members. 179 The upshot is
that the corporate board of directors did not develop as an institution to
manage the business corporation. Rather, it is an institution the business
corporation inherited when the business corporation evolved out of societies of independent merchants. These earlier merchant societies or
companies, in tum, apparently adopted boards to replace less structured
governance under a combination of officers and decision-making by assemblies of the entire membership.
C.

Continental European Antecedents

While American use of corporate boards evidently traces to English
practice , it would be a mistake to give the English sole credit for developing the board-centered model of corporate governance that is used
around the world. Rather, it appears that board-centered corporate gov-

176. Among the ordinances imposed on the members of the Merchant Adventurers was a prohibition on marrying women born outside of England. See 2 DAVIS, supra note 105, at 80.
177. See id at 79. Sometimes, however , these non-London companies of Merchant Adventurers, following older patterns of guild governance , elected so-called masters and wardens, instead of
governors and assistants.
178. See CAWSTON& KEANE, supra note 116, at 255-77.
179. The fact that the Company of Merchant Adventurers collected admission fees and fines
meant that there was some need for auditing, but this does not seem to have been a function of the
board of assistants. See Ross L. Watts & Jerold L. Zimmern1an, Agency Problems, Auditing. and the
Theory of the Firm : Some Evidence, 26 J.L. & ECON.613, 620-21 (1983).
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ernance, even in its early stages, 180 was developing in continental Europe
on a roughly parallel track to its development in England.
One nice example of the parallel development of corporate boards
in England and in continental Europe comes from the East India companies. Two years after the formation of the English East India Company,
the Dutch government chartered the Dutch (or "United ") East India
Company . The charter (or octroi) of the Dutch East India Company provided for governance by a general council of governors (bewindhebbers).181 This council had sixty members, broken down into a certain
number of representatives from each of the various "chambers " which
had come together to form the Dutch East India Company . These cham bers consisted of smaller groups of merchants in Amsterdam (which had
twenty representatives on the council), Rotterdam and Delft (which had
fourteen representatives), Hoorn and Enkhuizen (which had fourteen
182
representatives), and Zealand (which had twelve representatives).
These merchant groups already had formed shipping companies for trade
with the East Indies, and, at least at the inception of the Dutch East India
Company, actually may have conducted the voyages (while the overall
Dutch company, much like the English regulated companies , served to
create a cartel and to present a united face when dealing with outsiders).1 83 Evidently , a sixty-member board turned out to be unwield y, and
so the Dutch East India Company established a second smaller board
(the Collegium) with seventeen members. This board, too, also had a
certain number of representatives from each of the chambers - in this
case, Amsterdam received eight, and Zealand four, and the other four
184
chambers each received one. The seventeenth position rotated.
Working backwards , the governance structure of some overseas
communities of Hanseatic merchant s displayed a parallel to the board
governance of the Merchant Adventur ers and Merchants of the Staple. In
medieval Europe, the term "hanse" referred to associations of traveling
merchant s frequenting a foreign country. These merchants banded together for protection, to secure trading privil eges, and to police the trad180. There are, of cour se, significant continent al Europea n cont ribu tions to corporate boards
after the advent of general incorpora tion laws in the United States and elsewhere. These contributions include, most notably, the German invention of the two-tier board and co-determination. See
supra notes 7-8, see infra note 399.
18 I. See Schmitthoff , supr a note 149, at 93-94.
I 82. See HOLDEN FURBER, RIVA L EMPIRES OF TRA DE IN T HE O RI ENT 1600-1800, at I 88
(1976).
183. See Schmitthoff, supra note 149, at 94 .
I 84. See Win fried van den Muijsenberg h, Corpora te Gove rnance: The Dutch Experience, I 6
TRANSNAT' L L AW. 63, 64 (2002) .
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ing practices of their fellow merchants. While there were hanse of various nationalities (such as a Flemish hanse of London), during the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, German merchants had important hanse in
London, Novgorod, Bergen and Bruges. Cooperation, initially on trade
issues , between the towns from which these German merchants came,
produced what is known as the Hanseatic League. In London, the Hanseatic merchants had living quarters and worked in a compound bordering the Thames , called the Steelyard. The Steelyard hanse elected an alderman and a committee of twelve (one-third elected by the
Rhinelanders, one-third elected by merchants from Westphalian , Saxon
and Wendish towns, and one-third elected by the Prussians and German
Baits) to govern the community. Similarly, an alderman and a council
governed the German merchants in Bergen. The Hanseatic community in
Bruges had a board of six aldermen until 1472; after which three aldermen, advised by a committee of twelve, administered the hanse. Like the
governors (or mayors) and the boards of the Merchant Adventurers and
Merchants of the Staple, these governing institutions of the Hanseatic
merchants acted to preserve the group's trade privileges , to enforce rules
of trade , and to adjudicate disputes among the merchants. 185
It is important to note, however, that innumerable business organizations in medieval Europe did not have boards. While this is obvious
for sole proprietorships and small partnerships, even some relatively
large-scale business organizations in continental Europe of the Middle
Ages did not have anything like a board. For example , large Italian mercantile and banking companies , such as the Peruzzi and Medici companies, lacked a board. Instead, these were partnerships operated under the
domination of a family leader or trusted manager. The Peruzzi company
(which existed from around 1275 to 1343) operated as a single partnership with branch operations. Partners in the company managed the major
branches (Avignon, Bruges, London, Nap les, Palermo and Paris), while
factors (salaried employees) managed lesser branches. All partners residing in Florence (the company's home city) had the right to participate in
management, but, as a practical matter , one partner , who gained the confidence of the others, largely ran the business. For almost a century
(from 1397 to 1494) the Medici conducted banking and manufacturing
operations. Instead of operat ing as one large partnership , the Medici established the equivalent to a holding company arrangement in which
separate partnerships conducted operations in various locales, while the

185. See R. de Roover, The Organization of Trade, in THE CAMBRIDGE E CONOMI C HISTORY
OF E UROPE 111-15 (M.M. Postan et al. eds., 1963).
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main partnership in Florence retained majority control over the local
partnerships. As the family members became distracted with Florentine
politics, a principal administrator (called a ministro) provided overall
supervision from Florence. 186 Overall, the development of corporate
boards in Continental Europe is consistent with the English experience:
corporate boards developed as a governance mechanism for merchant
societies (like the hanse) or merchant cartels (like the Dutch East India
Company), and only later evolved into the governance mechanism for
large business ventures with passive investors.
IV.

THE CONCEPTUAL 0R1GINS OF CORPORA TE BOARDS

The previous section of this Article looked at when and how corporate governance through elected boards developed and came to the
United States. This section asks why such a governance scheme originated. In other words, from what sources did the early corporations get
the idea of using elected governing boards? What purpose was this governance structure supposed to achieve? Why was this form of governance employed versus other alternatives?
In fact, corporate governance by a representative board, working
with a chief executive officer (a "governor" in the typical parlance of the
early corporate charters), is a reflection of political practices and ideas
widespread in Western Europe in the late Middle Ages. Specifically,
while fictional literature often pictures medieval Europe as a place of
autocratic governance by kings, 187 European political ideology and practice in the late Middle Ages, although hardly democratic, often called for
the use of collective governance by a body of representatives. Examples
of such representative governance ideas and practices are found in the
assemblies or parliaments of medieval European kingdoms, in town
councils, in governing councils for guilds, and in the Church. Given this
prevalent practice, and the ideology that underlay this practice, it was
natural for the early corporations to utilize board governance.

A. Parliamentary Assemblies
1. The Growth of Parliamentary Assemblies
European kingdoms in the late twelfth through fourteenth centuries
widely undertook the development and use of representative assemblies,

186. See id. at 76-87.
187. See, e.g., WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, RICHA RD Ill.
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which are precursors of today's parliaments. 188 The English Parliament,
because of its survival and ultimate influence , is the most noted exam189
ple. The English Parliament emerged in the thirteenth century out of
several pre-existing practices. Early English kings, like kings elsewhere
in Western Europe during the early Middle Ages, commonly had coun190
cils of advisors. Power struggles in the thirteenth century between the
kings and the barons created an impetus toward broader assemblies with
heads of the clergy and the barons. 191 During the final third of the thirteenth century, attendance at English parliaments began to expand beyond the King's council , the senior clergy , and the barons, to include
representatives of counties and towns. 192 The summonses issued by Edward I to the so-called Model Parliament of 1295 provide a good example. These summonses ordered the sheriffs of the counties to cause to be
elected to attend the parliament, with full power to do the business of the
parliament, two knights to represent each county, and two citizens to
represent each city and two burghers to represent each borough within a
I 88. See THOMASN . BISSON,MEDIEVALREPRESENTATIVE
INSTITUTIONS:THEIRORIGINSAND
NATUREI ( 1973).
189. See generally WILLIAMSTUBBS, THE CONSTITUTIONAL
H ISTORY OF ENGLANDIN ITS
ORIGINANDDEVELOPMENT(3d ed. 1888) [hereinafter STUBBS,CONSTITU
TIONALHISTORY].
IES IN WESTERNEUROPE900 -1300, at
I 90. See SUSANREYNOLDS,KINGDOMSANDCOMMUNIT
302-03, 305 (1984). Anglo-Saxon kings referred to such a council as a witen or witenagemot (as in
"meeting of the wise"). See JOHN CANNON,THE OXFORDCOMPANIONTO BRITISHHISTORY994
(1997).
191. For example, King John 's reluctant agreement to the Magna Carta in 1215 codified a prohibition on "aid" (loosely speaking, taxes), except to ransom the king, knight his eldest son, or
marry his eldest daughter, unless consented to by "common counsel" (commune consilium) composed of archbishops, bishops, abbots, counts, greate r barons, and the king 's tenant s-in-chief, summoned on at least forty days' notic e. See MAGNA CARTAOF 1215, reprinted in WILLIAMSTUBBS,
SELECTCHARTERSANDOTHERILLUSTRATIONS
OF ENGLISHCONSTITUTIONAL
HISTORY:FROMTHE
EARLIESTTIMESTO THE REIGNOF EDWARD THEFIRST33-34 (19 13) [hereinafter STUBBS,SELECT
CHARTERS]
. In 1258, Henry III agreed with the barons to a set of reforms commonly labeled the
"Provisions of Oxford ." See H.G. RICHARDSON& 0.0 . SAYLES, PARLIAMENTSAND GREAT
COUNCILS IN MEDIEVALENGLAND1-3 (1961). These provisions mandated holding three "parliaments" per year, at which both the fifteen members of the king's council , and twelve '' honest men"
elected by "the com mona lity" (presumab ly the barons), wou ld be pre sent. See PROVISIO
NS OF
OXFQ;;:D,reprinted in STUBBS,SELECT CHARTERS,supra at 387.
192. English kings, at least as far back as Richard I, periodically issued summo ns for one or
more counties to send representatives to appear before the king's court to discuss particular business. See D. PASQUET,AN ESSAYON THEORIGINSOF THEHOUSEOF COMMONS223 (R.G .D. Laffan
trans., 1925) . Beginning in 1265, English kings went beyond such isolated appearances by county
representatives, and would, at times, summon all counties and towns to send representatives to a
parliament. See Summons lo the Parliament of 1265, reprinted in STUBBS,SELECTCHARTERS
, su pra note 191, at 398 . Actually, writers often credit the "par liament" assembled by Simon de Montfort during his strugg le with the king in 1264 as being the first "parliament " in England to include
representatives of the towns and count ies. See MICHAELA.R. GRAVES, THE PARLIAMENTSOF
EARLY MODERNEUROPE18 (2001).
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county. 193 Eventually, the knights and the town representatives began to
meet together in a chamber separately from the barons, thereby establishing what became the House of Commons, while the barons meeting
194
together became the House of Lords.
While the English parliament provides the most noted example of
the development of European parliamentary institutions in the Middle
Ages, England was not the only, or even likely the first, medieval European country to develop a parliament. Instead, many historians credit
several Spanish kingdoms, such as Leon and Aragon-Catalonia, with es195
tablishing the first parliaments, which the kingdoms called "Cortes."
In the end, however, the unification of Spain did not produce a unification of the Cortes, and the power of the Cortes seems to have receded,
following the fifteenth century, in the face of the growing authority of
196
the Spanish monarchy.
Aragon-Catalonian Cortes spread into Sicily, Sardinia and southern
Italy, 197 while elsewhere in Italy, a variety of parliaments and similar assemblies came into being, beginning as early as the mid-thirteenth century assemblies between nobles, clergy and town representatives con198
Ultimately,
vened by the Holy Roman Emperor, Frederick Il.
however, the medieval Italian parliaments waned in the face of the grow-

193. See Summonses to the Parliament of November 1295, reprinted in STUBBS, SELECT
CHARTERS,supra note 191, at 478. After 1327, English kings summoned knig hts and town representatives to every parliament. See RICHARDSON& SAYLES,supra note 191, at 44.
194. See PASQUET,supra note 192, at 224-30.
195. See GRAVES, supra note 192, at 14-15. For example, in 1188, King Alfonso of Leon
summoned representatives of the clergy, nobility and towns togethe r into a Cortes at which he
agreed not to "make war or peace or treaty unless with the counsel of bishops, nobles and good
men . . . ." Royal Engagements 10 a Cortes includin g Town Deputies at Leon, reprinted in BISSON,
supra note 188, at 143. In the combined kingdom of Aragon and Catalonia, Cortes appear to have
included representatives of towns as early as 1163 and 1214 (see Gaines Pos t, Roman Law and
Early Representation in Spain and Italy, 1150-1250, 18 SPECULUM211, 212, 219-21 (1943)), which
is well before this occurred in England. In 1283, Peter Ill of Aragon confirmed, if not established,
the constitutional power of the Aragon-Catalan Cortes, when he summoned togethe r clerics, nobles,
and town representati ves for a Cortes at which he promised annual assemblies and no new law s
without the assembly's assent. See GRAVES,supra note 192, at 15.
196. See BRUCELYON, Medieval Conslilutionalism: A Balance of Power, in STUDIESOF WEST
EUROPEANMEDIEVALINSTITUTIO
NS, at 176 (1978). Bui see Jean Nicolas et al., The Monarchic
Stale and Resislance, in RESISTANCE, REPRESENTATlON, ANDCOMMUNITY,at 73- 74 (Peter Bli ck le
ed., 1997) (challenging the traditional view that the Cortes declined as a consequence of the increa sing power of the Spanish monarchs).
197. See GRAVES,supra note 192, at 16.
198. See LYON, supra note 196, at 168-69.

132

HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 33:89

ing authoritarian power of the heads of the city-states, so that, by the
height of the Renaissance, only three Italian parliaments remained. 199
In medieval Germany, parliament-like assemblies occurred both on
a national or imperial level (a Reichstag or diet) and on the level of the
principalities (a Landtage). 200 The extent to which the Reichstag, with a
few historic exceptions, constituted a real parliament is in doubt, however, not because of too much sovereign control, but, ironically, because
of too little. As the Holy Roman Emperor became increasingly powerless, control shifted to the local princes and towns acting individually
rather then through the Reichstag. 201 Hence, the Landtage, which were
assemblies of local nobles and town representatives in a principality,
constituted the more significant representative assemblies in medieval
Germany. These assemblies frequently played a role of arbitrator in resolving dynastic disputes involving either succession to the throne or
partition of territory, and often used the occasion to extract concessions,
such as control over taxes. 202
French assemblies with participants from the nobility, the clergy
and the towns became known as the Estates, as they included representatives of the three estates (or classes) which, under the view of the time,
comprised medieval society. 203 As with medieval Germany, medieval
France had both national assemblies, the Estates General, 204 and local
assemblies, the provincial Estates, and, as in Germany, the local assemblies became the more important. In France, however, this phenomenon
stemmed from the growing power of the monarchy over the local lords,
rather than vice versa. French kings (perhaps fearing the example set by
the growing power of the English parliaments) by and large declined to
call for Estates General, and, instead, sought consent to increased aid

199. See H.G. Koenigsberger, The Parliament of Piedmont During the Renaissance, 1460/560, l l ETUDES69, 70 (1952).
200. SeeLYON,supranote 196,at 166.
201. Id. at 166-67.
202. In the late fourteenth century, a strong Landtage emerged in the principalities of Hesse,
Bavaria, Saxony, Brandenburg, and Bohemia. See GRAVES,supra note l 92, at 23-24.
203 . See JOSEPH BILLIOUD,LES ETATS DE BOURGOGNEAux XIVE ET XVE SIECLES 328-29
(l 922). Interestingly, France also had institutions labeled "parlements," but these institutions were
composed of magistrates and their function was judicial. See Nicolas et al., supra note l 96, at 78-80.
204. Historians generally consider the Estates General to begin with the assembly convened in
Paris in 1302 by the French king, Phillip the Fair, who was seeking support in his dispute with the
Pope. In order to obtain the necessary revenues, Phillip went beyond the traditional assembly of
lords who owed a direct feudal obligation to the king, and also summoned representatives of villas
(towns) to appear with the full power to consent to grant aid. See CHARLESH. MCILAWIN,Medieval
Estates, 7 THE CAMBRIDGEMEDIEVALHISTORY683-87 ( 1932).
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from the provincial Estates. 205 At the same time, French nobles did not
combine to force the king to call national assemblies, as had the English
barons. 206 As a result, Estates in provinces negotiated over and consented to taxes, and played what turned into an ever-decreasing role as a
207
constitutional check on the growing power of the French monarchy.
2. Parliamentary Assemblies and Corporate Boards
To what extent did these medieval assemblies and parliaments inspire, or else reflect common thinking with, the earliest corporate
boards? One difficulty with answering this question arises from the fact
that historians have engaged in seemingly endless interpretation, revised
thinking and debate as to the nature, origins and impact of these medieval assemblies and parliaments. 208 For example, whi le a pioneering historian in the field, William Stubbs, argued that the essential elements of
a parliament, as recognized in late thirteenth century England, were: (1)
the existence of a central or national assembly; (2) that included representatives of all classes of people (nobility and commons); (3) the
classes being present or having freely elected their representatives; and
(4) which possessed powers of taxation, legislation and general political
deliberation, 209 the legal historian, Frederic Maitland, argued that the
core of a parliament, as understood in the thirteenth century, was a session of the king's council, and that much of the business of a parliament
was judicial (hearing petitions and resolving grievances and the like). 210

205. See ROBERTFAWTIER,Par/ement d'Angle1erre et Etats Generaux de France au Mayen
Age, in COMPTES
RENDUSDEL' ACADEM
IE DESINSCRIPTIONS
276-84 (1953).
206. See LYON, supra note 196, at 173-75.
207. See Gustave Dupont-Ferrier, De Quelques Problemes Historiques Relatif.5 aux Etats
Provinciaux, J. DES SAVANTS315 (1928). There were a variety of assemblies and parliaments in
medieval European kingdoms beyond those in England, Spain, Italy, Germany and France. See
GRAVES,supra note 192, at 14-25. One of these, that in Brabrant (now part of Belgium), bears special mention. In a series of charters, culminating in the so-called Joyeuse Entree (often referred to as
the Belgian Magna Carta), the dukes ofBrabrant (who were in serious financial trouble) granted to a
council composed of nobles and representatives of wealthy towns, control over war, alliances, ducal
appointments, legislation and taxes. See LYON, supra note 196, at 179-80.
208. For a good overview of the principal streams of thought involved in these interpretations,
revisions and debates, see BISSON,supra note 188, at 1-5.
209. See generally STUBBS,CONSTITUTIONAL
HISTORY
, supra note 189.
210. See fREDERJC w. MAITLAND, RECORDS OF THE PARLIAM
ENT HOLDEN AT
WESTMIN
ISTER.ix-xxi (1893 ). Historians writing more recently have continued this debate. Compare
RICHARD
SON& SAYLES,supra note 191, at 2 (stating that the function of thirteenth century English
parliaments was essentially judicial) , with BERTIEWILKINSON
, STUDIESIN THECONSTITUTIONAL
HISTORYOF THETHIRTEENTH
ANDFOURTEENTHCENTURIES14-29, 50-54 (2d ed. 1952) (stating
that the function of medieval English parliaments was essentially to make political decisions).
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Historians have propounded various theories as to why parliaments
developed in Europe in the late twelfth through fourteenth centuries.
Some suggest that such assemblies were a natural outgrowth of medieval
ideas concerning the need for consultation and consensus decisionmaking, which held that both custom and common law required the king
to consult with, and obtain the acquiescence of, the broader community
when making decisions. 211 Other historians emphasize the Roman and
Canon Law doctrines of quod omnes tangit ab omnibus approbetur
("what touches all is to be approved by all"), and plena potestas (the
"full power" of a representative to bind a corporate body to decisions) as
providing the legal basis for the development of medieval parliaments. 212
Many historians see fiscal needs providing a critical impetus for the development of parliaments , as growing demands for revenue increasingly
forced kings to seek consent from assemblies for taxes.213 Yet other historians argue that parliaments may have been an outgrowth of military
assemblies in which the king sought counsel regarding, and support for,
decisions regarding war. 2 14 The traditional history of the English parliament, as recited earlier, emphasizes the demands of nobility for consultation as providing an impetus for the development of parliaments; but
other historians argue that parliaments were a burden imposed by the
kings, much like typical attitudes toward a present-day summons for jury
duty.2 15 A theory often associated with German historians views medieval parliaments as an outgrowth of medieval corporatism- not in the
sense of business corporations, but in the sense that medieval society
was organized into various collectives or corporate groups (churches ,
guilds, towns, etc.), each one of which possessed various rights and
privileges. Under this theory, medieval parliaments developed as a compromise through which the king dealt with the representatives of the
more powerful corporat e groups in society.216 Of course, many of these
21 1. See, e.g. , REYNOLDS
, sup ra note 190, at 302-305. This cu stom and common law may , in
turn, have been a produ ct of a fusion between Germani c trib al trad ition s and C hrist ian ideas regarding communi ty. See infra notes 3 14- 16 and accompan ying text.
2 12. See Br ian Tierney, Medieva l Canon Law and Western Constitutionalism, 52 CATH. HIST.
REV. I , 13 ( 1966 ).
2 13. See JOHN8 . MORRALL, POLITICALT HOUGHT IN M EDIEVALTIMES60 (1962).
2 14. See Tho mas N . Bisso n, The Military Origins of Medie val Representa tion, 71 AM. HIST.
REV. 1199 (l 966) .
2 15. See PASQUET, supra note 192, at 223-3 0.
216. See E mile Lou sse, Parlementarisme ou corpor atisme? Les origines des assemblees
d 'etats , 4 Revu e Histor ique de Droi t Francai s et Etranger 684-706 ( 1935). Just as there are diff erent
theories for the orig ins of medie val parlia me nts, there are also diff er ent explan ations as to why the
English parliament surv ived w hen other med ieval Europ ean parliaments withered. Wh ile some
nineteenth century historians att ribu ted the surv iva l of the English pa rliament to innate characteris -
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theories as to the nature, origins and impact of medieval European parliaments are not mutually inconsistent, but rather, much like the blind
persons' descriptions of the elephant, are simply emphasizing different
aspects of a multi-faceted phenomenon.
Needless to say, there is not the space here to explore all of the
varying theories and debates about medieval European parliaments. Instead, what is important for purposes of this Article is the extent to
which the use of boards in early business corporations resulted from imitating medieval European parliaments, or, more likely, whether the underlying ideas that produced medieval European parliaments also promoted the use of boards in early business corporations . In the absence of
direct evidence of linkage, we must examine the similarities and differences in practices and concepts between the two institutions. At first
glance, there is an obvious similarity between early corporate boards and
medieval parliaments in that both seemingly involve collective decisionmaking by a representative group. Yet, on closer scrutiny, it is not simple to say whether medieval parliaments embodied all, or even mo.st, of
the underlying concepts discussed earlier in this Article 217 which define
the board-centered model of corporate governance; i.e., decision-making
by a group of peers, elected to represent (rather than themselves constituting all of) the owners, and who have the ultimate authority over the
executive officers.
To begin with, the mere assembly of nobles, clergy and town representatives with the king did not mean that there was collective or peer
group decision-making in the medieval "parliaments." After all, even the
most autocratic medieval monarch might wish to call an assembly of nobles, clergy and perhaps town representatives in order to announce decisions or as an audience for major events in the kingdom (coronations or
the like). Alternate ly, monarchs with absolute authority might seek advice from, and the support of, a council or a broader assembly, but nevertheless retain power to make the ultimate decision. Nevertheless, while

tics of the English people, see, e.g., STUBBS, CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY, supra note 189, at 1-11,
more recent historians find the explanation in a balance of power between the English kings, nobles ,
and towns , which prevented the withering of parliaments at the hands of absolute monarchs (as later
occurred in France and Spain) on the one hand , or the fracturing of parliaments as a result of conflicts between overly powerful local lords and towns (as occurred in Germany and Italy) on the
other hand . See, e.g., LYON , supra note 196 at, 157-183. Geography that was not too large (as in
France), or too small (as in various city states), also may have given the English parliament a
"Goldilock s" like survival advantage. See, e.g., Robert Fawtier, Parlement d'Angleterr e et £tat s
Generaux de France au Mayen Age , in COMPES·RENDUS DE L' ACADEMIE DES INSCRfPTIONS ET
BELLES·LEITRE S 276-84 (1953).
217 . See supra notes 8-25.
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many medieval assemblies-even ones to which a medieval chronicler
might attach the label "parliament" or an equivalent term-no doubt fit
within these two possibilities, many medieval parliaments did entail real
collective or peer group decision-making. 218 For example, it would not
seem to have made much sense for the English barons to press the king
to agree in Magna Carta to obtain consent of "common counsel" to
"aid," (taxes) or to agree in the Provisions of Oxford to hold three parliaments per year,219 if such assemblies could only give non-binding advice to the king, but otherwise must approve or carry out the king's decisions. Other assemblies for which there seems to be good evidence of
real decision-making power include the council of nobles and town representatives in Brabant, which had control over war, alliances, ducal appointments, legislation and taxes; the Aragon-Catalan Cortes, which had
a veto over new laws; and the Landtage of some of the German principalities.220 Beyond the evidence of specific practice, the Roman or
Canon Law doctrine of quad omnes tangit ab omnibus approbetur (what
touches all is to be approved by all) would not seem to be met by a parliament that had no choice about consenting to the king's decisions.221
Whether the concept of representation embodied in the boardcentered model of corporate governance (that shareholders elect a group
of directors, rather than manage the firm themselves) is anything like the
"representative" nature of medieval parliaments is an even more complex question. The complexity arises from the different meanings encapsulated within the overall idea of representation. At its simplest level,
both corporate boards and medieval parliaments are "representative" in
the sense that a smaller group makes decisions binding upon a larger
group, instead of having the entire body of shareholders (in the corporation), or the entire body politic (in the kingdom) make decisions. Indeed,
many historians attach great significance to the Roman or Canon Law
2 18. See A NTONIO MARONGTU, MEDIEVAL PARLIAMENT S: A COMPARATIVE STUDY 45-67
(1968)
2 19. See supra note I 91.
220. See supra notes I 95-207 and accompanying text.
221. But see MORRALL , sup ra note 213, at 65. The fact that many medieval parliaments exercised real collective decision-making authority does not nece ssarily mean that they operated through
formal votes and majority rule , as would a modem legislature. Instead, medieval political philosophy typically placed a high value on consensus-based dec isions. See REYNOLDS, supra note 190, at
3 I 9. Still, this fact might not distingui sh medieval politi cal thought from current board-centered
corporate governance , since corpora te boards also typically operate, in practice if not in law,
through consensus- based decisions. See Manning , supra, note 34, at I 483. In any even t, as remain s
true both in legislatures and corporate boards today, the theore tical right to refuse consent does not
mean that , as a matter of practical politics, a board or legislative body will say no to a strong or
popular chief exec utive.
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doctrine of plena potestas (the full power of a representative to bind a
corporate body to decisions) in turning feudal assemblies into parliaments. It was through this doctrine that representatives of the towns
bound the towns to the decisions (particularly regarding taxes) of the
parliaments, rather than the king having to negotiate tax collection or the
like with each town. 222 On the other hand, the concept of representation
seemingly embodied in plena potestas, as well as encompassed within
the corporatist view of medieval society, was that individuals represented particular groups-for example, the burgher represented the particular town that sent him-rather than the whole kingdom. 223 This is
different from the representative capacity of the board members of the
early English business corporations, who typically did not represent any
particular group of owners. 224 In fact, this difference in the nature of representation between legislatures (in which members represent particular
states or districts) and corporate boards (at least in the absence of articles
creating classified boards) carries through to the present time.225 Yet another interpretation within the concept of representation stems from the
fact that the modern mind tends to equate "representation" with democratic election, and, both today, and in the early business corporations,
shareholders generally have elected members of the board.226 By contrast, despite the romantic views of earlier historians like Stubbs, town
222. See MORRALL,supra note 213, at 64-65.
223. See Summonses to the Parliament of November I 295, supra note 193 (stating that the
knights sent to parliament are to have "full and sufficient power for themselves and the community
of aforesaid shire," and the citizens and burghers sent to parliament are to have such power "for
themselves and the community of cities and boroughs separately," to do the business of parliament
( emphasis added).
224. Actually, this seems to have been more true in English versus continental European corporations , as witnessed by a comparison of the English East India Company (which, for most of its
history , seems to have had a board elected at large by all voting members) with the Dutch East India
Company-whose board consisted of a defined number of representatives for each of the various
"chambers" (merchant groups in different Dutch cities) which made up the company. See supra text
accompanying notes 181-84. It is also worth noting that the 1505 charter of the Company of Merchant Adventurers called for the election of persons of "divers (sic] fellowships ." See supra text
accompanying note 175. This may suggest an intent that the board members, even if elected at large,
should come from, and thereby represent, different factions or groups within the Merchant Adventurers.
225. There is some difference in this regard , however, between Anglo-American corporations,
and those Getman and other continental European corporations that operate under a system of codetennination in which the supervisory board has representatives of the shareholders and representatives of labor. See supra note 52 and accompanying text.
226. See supra text accompanying notes 8-14. Boards of early corporations, however , provide
some noteworthy exceptions to shareholder election of directors . As discussed earlier, the initial
charter of the London and the Plymouth Companies empowered the king to name the members of
the governing council, while "assistants" on the governing board of the Eastland Company retained
their positions on good behavior. See supra text accompanying notes I 05-15.
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citizens may not have elected, in any democratic sense, their representatives to medieval parliaments. 227 Indeed, there may have been little demand for democratic elections at a time when people naturally assumed
that older, wealthier and more powerful members of the community
should speak for the community, 228and when acting as a representative
to parliament was a significant unpaid burden. 229 Gradually, more and
more residents of the counties and towns gained the right to vote in the
election of representatives to the English Commons; yet it was to be centuries before such elections typically involved any choice between com230
On the other hand, the lack of competing candipeting candidates.
dates remains typical of corporate board elections today. 231
The most striking difference between medieval parliaments and
corporate boards, however, may go to relations with the chief executive.
While the corporate board of directors is at least theoretically supreme
over the chief executive, the question of parliaments' supremacy versus
the kings' arose in centuries of European disputes 232 ( of which the English Civil War constitutes one dramatic example). Indeed , the relationship of medieval monarch with parliament (or the equivalent assembly)
provided the most visible, but by no means the only, example of an underlying tension running throughout medieval political thinking-this
being how to resolve the value medieval society placed on hierarchy and
respect for authority with the value it placed on collective decisionmaking.233 Hence, even if a medieval parliament had real collective decision-making, as opposed to solely advisory, power (for instance to refuse a request for aid or taxes), this does not mean that such a parliament
had the same ultimate power presently entailed in the board-centered
model of corporate governance. Most especially, there would appear to
be a major difference between the power of the corporate board to select
and remove the chief executive, and the medieval parliaments ' general
lack of power to do the same with the king. 234 Still, this difference may

227. See REYNOLDS, supra note I 90, at 310.
228. See id. at 251.
229. See generally, e.g., PASQUET,supra note 192.
230. See Nicolas et al., supra note 196, at 120-21 (describing growth of the franchi se, but the
lack of choice between candidates, in elections to the English Commons from the fifteenth through
seventeent h centuries) .
23 1. See supra text acco mpanying notes 64-66.
232. See OTTOGIERKE,POLITICAL THEORIESOF THEMIDDLE AGE 30-48 (Frederick William
Maitland trans., 1938).
233. See REYNOLDS, supra note 190, at 51-52.
234. See MARCIA L. COLISH, MEDIEVAL FOUNDATIONS
OF THE WESTERNINTELLECTUAL
TRADJTTO
N 400-1400, at 348-49 ( 1997). But see GIERKE,supra note 232. at 45-46 (discussing me-

2004]

ORIGINS OF THE CORPORATE BOARD

139
235

be less dramatic than one initially might assume. As discussed earlier,
the boards in the early corporations typically lacked the power to select
or remove the corporation ' s governor (whom typically the members directly elected). Moreover, medieval assemblies apparently had a say in
236
selecting the king on a number of instances. For example, some historians claim that Anglo-Saxon kings required the consent of the witan
237
and, as stated earlier,
(council of advisors) to choose a successor,
German parliaments arbitrated succession disputes between competing
claimants to the throne.
All in all, even though there are important differences between corporate boards and medieval parliaments, there are enough similarities to
suggest a common conceptual heritage based upon ideas of collective
decision-making by representatives of a broader community. This is well
illustrated by the invocation of the Roman or Canon Law doctrines of
quad omnes tangit ab omnibus approbetur (what touches all is to be approved by all) and plena potestas (the full power of a representative to
bind a corporate body) as the legal basis for medieval European parliaments . Significantly, these two Roman or Canon Law doctrines were by
no means solely, or even particularly, applicable to parliaments and
kingdoms. Rather , they originated in very different contexts. Medieval
Canon Law jurists and scholars originally developed the doctrine of
quad omnes tangit ab omnibus approbetur from a Roman law technical
rule involving co-tutorship into a rationale for allowing lay representatives to attend General Councils of the Church, 238 while plena potestas
originally involved the power of agents to represent corporations in civil
suits.239 The transposition of these two doctrines into a legal basis for
medieval parliaments then occurred when summonses for attendance at
medieval parliaments (which lawyers trained in Canon Law probably
drafted) started invoking the two principles in describing the purpose
and nature of the representation commanded. 240 Yet, there is no reason to
suppose that doctrines so conveniently transposed into a legal basis for
dieval jurist s' claims that representative assemblies might remove a sovere ign who neglected his
duties).
235. See supra text accompanying note s 101-09.
236. See GIERKE,supra note 232, at 42.
237. See SIMON SCHAMA, 2 A HISTORY OF BRITAIN : THE WAR S OF THE BRITISH 1603-1776, at
80 (2000) .
238. See gene rally Tierney , supra note 212.
239. See Post, supra note 195, at 211.
240. See Summonses to the Parliament of November 1295, supra note 193 (reciting the doctrine that "what touche s all is to be approved by all" in se tting forth the purpose of the summons,
and commanding that the county and town representati ves have ''fu ll power" to do the busines s of
the parliament).
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representative parliaments might not also serve, even without express
restatement , the same function for the boards of early business corporations. Indeed , the 1505 charter of the Company of Merchant Adventurers
grants the board "full power and authority" to rule and govern over the
merchants. 241 This suggests a common legal basis for corporate boards
and medieval parliaments, since both institutions served as vehicles to
obtain the consent required by the doctrine of quod omnes tangit ab omnibus approbetur through representatives with full power (plena potestas) to give the consent on behalf of the broader community.
It is also worth keeping in mind that some of the apparent differences between medieval parliaments and corporate boards may wane
when one compares medieval parliaments to boards in the early, rather
than in today's, corporations. For example, while the judicial function of
medieval parliaments (for whom, as mentioned above, a significant, if
not primary, task was resolving legal disputes) seems very different from
the role of a modern corporate board , much of the function of the board
of the Company of Merchant Adventurers was, as discussed earlier, 242 to
resolve mercantile disputes involving members of the company.

B.

Town Councils

Town councils constitute a second example of medieval European
collective decision-making by representative bodies, and, indeed, provide an example that is highly relevant in searching for the conceptual
origins of the corporate board of directors. There is stronger evidence
that the use of governing boards in the early corporations was either an
imitation of town councils, or at least based upon a common intellectual
foundation, than is available to establish such linkage with medieval parliaments. Moreover, since the creation of medieval European town
councils often constituted a departure from either a hierarchical governance of the municipality solely by executive officials, at one extreme, or
a sort of direct democratic governance under which all enfranchised
members of the community participated, at the other extreme, understanding the motivations behind the use of town councils might provide
insight into why the early corporations chose to employ a board structure, rather than leaving a chief executive in charge or following the
partnership style system of all owners managing the company.

241. See CAWSTON& KEANE,supra note 116, at 250.
242. See supra note 179 and accompanying text.
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1. The Growth of Town Councils
Across W estem Europe during the Middle Ages, representative
243
town councils became a common feature of municipal governance . As
with medieval parliaments, the English experience provides a noted example. The first documented municipal council in medieval English his244
tory is found in Ipswich in the year 1200. On May 25, 1200, King
John granted a charter to Ipswich. 245 The Ipswich charter empowered the
town to elect two bailiffs and four coroners, who then became the executive officials of the town. 246 For our purposes, however, what is most
important is something that was not in the charter. According to a
247
chronicle apparently made by the town clerk, on June 29, 1200, an assembly of the town occurred in the churchyard of St. Mary's Tower in
order to carry out the election of the bailiffs and coroners as commanded
by the charter. After completing this election, the gathered townsfolk
then decided that "henceforth there should be in the said borough twelve
sworn chief portmen, 248 as there are in other free boroughs of England,
and that they should have full power, for themselves and for the whole
town, to govern and maintain the said borough and all its liberties, to
render judgments of the town and also to keep, ordain, and do in the said

243. See FRITZRORIG,THE MEDIEVALTOWN 26 (1967).
244. See HEATHERSWANSON,MEDIEVALBRITISHTOWNS 80 (1999) . This is not to suggest
that Ipswich was a particularly important or innovative burg, even in medieval times. Rather, lpswich 's prime place in the history of English municipal government is the result of its good fortune
in making a chronicle of the relevant events and in having that record survive the subsequent centuries.
245. See CARL STEPHENSON,BOROUGH AND TOWN, A STUDY OF URBAN ORIGINS IN
ENGLAND174 (1933) . In large part, the Ipsw ich charter is a fairly typical example of the charters
granted by John and other kings to borough s in the Middl e Ages. Indeed , a charter granted earlier
the same year to Northampton apparently served as the model for the Ipswich charter, as well as for
the charters granted to Gloucester, Lincoln and Shrewsbury. Id. at 174 n.6 . The Ipsw ich charter
granted the burgesses of the town a "fee fann ," in other words, the right to collect their own taxes
and remit to the king his share, as opposed to having a royal appointee (a "reeve") collect the taxes
(and presumably keep a bit for himself). The charter also granted certain other rights and privileges
that had the effect of removin g the burgesses of Ipswich from feudal status, suc h as exemptions
from toll s, and the right to try disputes in their own co urts rather than in the cou rt of the local noble.
See COLINPLATT,THE ENGLISHMEDIEVALTO\\IN 130 (1976).
246. The bailiffs had the function of the former reeve, while the coroners, who had broader
dutie s than entailed in our current notion of the office, handled judicial and various other matter s
pertaining to the crown, and were also responsible for supervising the bailiffs. See STEPHENSON,
supra note 245, at l 75.
247. There has been some argument about the authenticity of this chronicle as being , in fact, a
contemporary account, as opposed to a later interpolation. Id. at 177 (discussing the basis for the
challenge and rejecting the argument).
248. The word "port" at this time could be used synonymously with borough, so that, for ex, supra note
ample, the borough court was often referred to as the "portmanmoot." See SWANSON
244, at 75.
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borough whatever should be done for the well-being and honor of the
said town. " 249
While we only have the word of the burgesses of Ipswich for the
assertion that town councils were already the norm among free boroughs
of England in 1200, it was not long before other documented examples
of English town councils appeared. 250 The evidence shows that among
English free boroughs after the twelfth century, a town council of twelve
or twenty-four members was the norm. 251
Just as the case with medieval parliaments, England was not the
first medieval European country to have widespread town councils.
Rather, documents show increasing use of such councils already occurring in other medieval European countries during the century before the
events at Ipswich. Not surprisingly in view of their rapid growth , Italian
medieval cities provide some of the earliest evidence of the use of town
252
councils. In the twelfth century , groups composed of so-called "consuls"-typically
numbering from four to twelve, or a multiple
53
thereof -governed many Italian cities. 254 Because of continued strife

249. See STEPHENSON,
supra note 245, at 175 (translating from the original Latin).
250. See PLATT, supra note 245, at 132 (stating that records reflect the election in 1206 of a
council of twenty-four for London).
251. See STEPHENSON,
supra note 245, at 174 n.4. Later, as municipal governance in England
evolved into the sixteenth century, a bicameral council system replaced the single council in many
English cities. This commonly entailed an inner council of twelve or twenty-four members (that was
often self-perpetuating, rather than elected), and an elected outer council of some greater number
(often a multiple of twelve). See PETERCLARK& PAUL SLACK,ENGLISHTOWNS IN TRANSITlON
1500-1700,at2 9, 128-29( 1976).
252. There are suggestions of the existence of some sort of town counci I in Pisa by I 081, when
the Holy Roman Emperor, Henry IV, issued a charte r to Pisa, promising various liberties, and agreeing not to appoint any marquis in Tuscany unless twelve representatives of Pisa gave their consent
in an assembly summoned by the town bells; albeit it is unclear whether these twelve persons were a
permanent council. See REYNOLDS,
supra note 190, at 169.
253. See JOHNH. MUNDY& PETERRIESENBERG
, THE MEDIEVAL
TOWN50 (1958).
254. See REYNOLDS
, supra note 190, at 169-70. At first, the local bishop or viscount (who repBALDWIN
,
resented the Holy Roman emperor) appointed these consuls. see SUMMERFIELD
BUSINESSIN THEMIDDLEAGES 52 (1937), but eventually they became either self-perpetuating or
else elected by a body of the leading citizens of the city. See RORIG,supra note 243, at 26. For example, in Florence during the twelfth century, the assembly which elected the consuls was known as
the "parlamentum." See R.W. CARSTENS,THE MEDIEVALANTECEDENTS
OF CONSTITUTIONA
LISM
18 (1992). As the Italian cities developed and internal dissension grew, their municipal governments
evolved. Whereas the consuls seemed to have performed representative, executive and judicial functions, see REYNOLDS, supra note 190, at 170, the new municipal constitutions often reposed the
executive function in a single office, the "podesta," see JAMESW. THOMPSON,ECONOMICAND
SOCIALHISTORYOF THE MIDDLEAGES (300-1300) 784 (2d ed. 1966) [hereinafter THOMPSON,
ECONOMI
C ANDSOClALHISTORY
], while the representat ive function might lie with a combination
of a twelve or twenty-four member lesser council, and broader assemblies. See ANTONYBLACK,
FROMTHETWELFTHCENTURYTO
GUILDS ANDCIVILSOCIETYIN EUROPEAN POLITICALTHOUGHT
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between various classes and factions, however, Italian cities, after a period of increasingly democratic governance during the thirteenth and
early fourteenth centuries, often ended up in the Renaissance governed
by magistrates and princes with dictatorial powers. 255
In the north, municipalities in Flanders also provide very early evidence of the use of town councils; albeit, this apparent precociousness
may simply reflect an accident of greater documentation. A succession
dispute in 1127 over who would become the count of Flanders has left
for later historians a written charter granted to Saint-Omer, the provisions in which might be typical of the rights of towns in Flanders at the
time. In addition to confirming the burgesses of the town's exemptions
from obligations of feudalism, the Saint-Omer charter, significantly for
our purposes, grants the burgesses the right to be tried by their own
"echevins." 256 While this suggests solely a judicial function for the socalled "echevins," it appears from later evidence that during the twelfth
century in Flanders the echevins had become a locally elected commission, normally numbering twelve persons, who handled all of the executive, as well as judicial, governance functions of the town. 257 Such councils with combined judicial and executive functions- sometimes called
echevins and sometimes called "jures"----can be found governing towns
throughout northern France by the middle to late twelfth century, while
in the south of France, similar institutions , but whose members possessed the Italian influenced name of consuls, were in charge of the
foremost towns by 1150.258 In the end, however , just as the growing
autocratic control by town princes doomed most Italian parliaments and
town councils alike, the growing power of the French monarchy caused
a decline in the power of both the Estates and the French town councils.
By the middle of the fifteenth century, royal officials were taking over
control from the consular government of the town burgesses in
France.259

THEPRESENT 48 (1984). These constitutions also sometimes adopted fairly elaborate schemes for
RG, supra note 253, at 79-80.
selecting members of the councils. See MUNDY& RIESENBE
255. See MUNDY& RlESENBERG,supra note 253, at 79, 82-83.
supra note 245, at 34-35 .
256. STEPHENSON,
257. Id. at 37.
258. Id. at 40-41. There were eight consuls in the governing group for Avignon, twelve in Marseilles, and twenty-four in Toulouse . See THOMPSON,
supra note 18, at 784.
, ENGLISHANDFRENCHTOWNSIN FEUDALSOCIETY:A COMPARATIV
E
259. See R.H. HILTON
STUDY 51 (1992).
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During the twelfth and thirteen centuries, the town council continued to spread throughout Western Europe. 260 The end result was that
town councils, commonly numbering twelve or some multiple thereof,
became a prevalent feature of medieval European municipal government.261
2. Town Councils and Corporate Boards
The earlier comparison of medieval European parliaments and corporate boards produced some, but admittedly only mixed, evidence of
imitation or a common conceptual underpinning. By contrast, there is
much stronger evidence of such commonality between early corporate
boards and medieval European town councils. To begin with, medieval
municipalities were often "corporations" themselves, and, hence, would
have provided a logical template for governance provisions in the charters of the early trading companies. Actually, medieval towns were corporations under a couple of different meanings of the term-b oth of
which, in fact, are significant in suggesting a linkage between town
councils and the early trading company boards.
The definition of a "corporation" that is more familiar to the lawyer
is that it is a fictitious legal entity or person, created by an act of the
state, which possesses rights such as the ability to hold property and to
sue and be sued, and can continue to exist despite the death of its mem262
bers. Many English towns, starting in the fifteenth century, sought and
received charters making them corporations in this sense.263 The typical
explanation for this action given by historians focuses on certain practical advantages that resulted from such status-especially, the ability of a
town to avoid application of the legislation on mortmain by becoming a
royally chartered corporation empowered to hold property. 264 The same
concerns with owning property despite the legislation on mortmain also
inspired a number of English guilds to seek royal grants of corporate
charters at this time. 265 Hence , it is entirely plausible that lawyers draft-

260. For example, presumably co py ing from Italy an d France , members of Germa n tow n cou ncils during the thirteenth century began to refer to themselves as consuls. See REYNO LDS, supra
note 190, at l 74.
261. Id. at 191.
262 . See Tmstees of Dartmouth Coll. v. Woodward, l 7 U.S . 5 18, 636 (18 19).
263 . See PLATT, supra note 245, at 142.
264. Id. at 143-44 . The fact that the rapid growth in corpora te charte rs for English tow ns began
after the extension, in 1391, of mortmain legisl ation to reac h towns and guilds supports this exp lanation.
265. See SUSAN R EYNO LDS, IDEAS AND SOLIDARITIES OF MEDIEVA L LA ITY ch . VI, pp. 12- 13
(1995) (hereinafter REYNOLDS, }DEAS].
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ing charters for towns, guilds, and, later, trading companies , would have
borrowed ideas, including with respect to governance , from the charter
of one type of corporation in order to include in the charter of another
type- particularly insofar as one aspect of the trend toward formal town
incorporation was the inclusion in the new charters of governance provi266
sions formalizing and refining the reliance on town councils.
There is another meaning of corporation, however, which would
have encompassed more towns, at an earlier stage, and could have had
an even more profound linkage to the governance of early trading companies. This meaning comes from a sort of realist theory of the corpora2 67
Under this aption often associated with German legal philosophers.
proach, a corporation is not some fictitious legal person created by an act
of the state, but rather the law's recognition that some groups can engage
in such a degree of collective action and have such a collective identity
that the collective itself starts to exist as an independent reality, and, as
such, possesses rights and liabilities. Medieval corporations in this sense
included guilds, universities , the Church or some of its components , and,
of importance here, towns. 268 We encountered this notion before as one
explanation of the development of medieval parliaments -s pecifically ,
that such parliaments arose as a mechanism through which representatives of the more powerful corporations dealt with the monarch. 269 While
this consequence of the corporate nature of medieval society impacted
political institutions external to the corporations themselves, the corporate nature of medieval society could also have had an impact on the nature of political or governing institutions within the corporations . This
internal impact, which, if present, would establish an extraordinarily
strong link between town councils and corporate boards , arises from the
possibility that the widespread existence of corporate collectives in medieval Europe produced overarching ideas about the governance of corporate collectives, no matter in what context the collecti ve arose-town,
guild, or trading company-and that these overarching ideas naturally
led to the introduction of councils and boards. 270 We shall return to the
266. Id. at ch. XIII, pp. 49-50 (giving the examp le of Gloucester , which adopted a charter following the " London model " of a mayo r, a council of aldermen, and a broad er common counc il);
CLARK & SLACK, supra note 25 1, at 128 (asserting the new charters were designed to promote control by the oligarchy) .
267. See Frederic William Maitland, Translator's Introduction, POLITICAL THEORIE S OF THE
MIDDLE AGE xxv-xxv ii ( 1900).
268. See BLACK, supra note 254, at 18-24.
269. See supra text accom panyi ng note 2 16.
270. One example of this transposition of governance ideas between types of corporatio ns so as
to create an overarching ideology of corporate (in the broadest sense of the word) governa nce, is
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prospect shortly when considering why medieval European towns developed councils.
In addition to providing a logical source for governance ideas for
the early trading corporations, medieval town councils had a practical
linkage to such corporations. This linkage comes through the merchant
guilds. As discussed above, 271 the early trading companies (as exemplified by the Company of Merchant Adventurers) were in large measure
little more than merchant guilds, which then morphed into the joint stock
companies. Guild leadership, in tum, substantially overlapped with
membership on medieval town councils. Once again, we can thank the
Ipswich chronicler for convenient evidence of this relationship. The
Ipswich charter, like many similar charters, granted the burgesses the
right to have a guild merchant. 272 The Ipswich chronicler relates how,
during the course of their organizing assemblies, the Ipswich townsfolk
selected one of the twelve chief portmen to be the alderman (or head) of
this guild, and named three other chief portmen, as well as one of the
273
In many instances,
coroners, to be the four assistants to the alderman.
the overlap between town council and the leadership of the merchant
guild went beyond common members. In Cologne, the managing com274
mittee of the merchant guild became the town's first govemment,
while, in Calais, the governing council of the Merchants of the Staple
ran the town for two years. 275 Florentine town councils for some time
276
In
were composed of representatives selected by the various guilds.
found in the works of the medieval jurist , Bartolus. Dealing with the issue of whether consent for
action by a city required an assembly of the populace, Bartolus applied the earlier work of the medieval scholar of Canon Law, Hostiensis, who wrote that the consent required of the members of
ecclesiastical colleges could only be given in a public assembly. See BLACK,supra note 254 , at 84.
271. See supra text accompanying notes 163, 176-77.
272. HILTON, supra note 259, at 93. Along similar lines, the 1127 charter for Saint-Omer contains various provisions supporting the town's guild . See STEPHENSON, supra note 245, at 35. The
charter granted to Gloucester in the same year as Ipswich's provides an interesting variation. Instead
of granting the various liberties to the town's burge sses, who are then empowered to have a guild
merchant , the Gloucester charter , for the most part, simply granted the libertie s associated with a
borough franchise to the "burgesses of Gloucester of the gild merchant, " i.e., to the memb ers of the
guild. Se e HILTON, supra note 259, at 93 .
273. See HILTON, supra note 259 , at 93. Even more dramatically , a comparison of a mid thirteenth century membership list of the Leicester town council , with the membership list at the
same time of the governing council of Leicester's merchant guild (both with twenty-four members) ,
shows that they were composed of virtually the same person s. PLATT, supra note 245 , at 133. During the sixteenth century , many of the Engli sh municipal leaders were closely identified with the
Merchant Adventurers , see CLARK& SLACK, supra note 251, at 129, whose charter , as discussed
above , helped establish the use of a board among English trading companies.
274. BLACK,supra note 254 , at 56.
275. See supra text accompanying note 170.
276. See CARSTENS, supra note 254, at 18-22.
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many towns, the guildhall served as, and ultimately became, the town
hall. 277 All told, given the connections between town councils and merchant guilds, and between merchant guilds and early trading companies,
it is difficult to believe that similarities between town councils and early
corporate boards are coincidental.
Additional evidence that early corporate boards were either imitating medieval town councils, or were based upon ideas held in common ,
comes from the comparing the composition of the two bodies. To begin
with, one strikingly common feature of the medieval town councils,
themselves , is the tendency of such councils to contain twelve, twentyfour, or some other multiple or fraction of twelve, members. This is not a
coincidence. Instead, it appears to derive from the twelve-person
princely court of Charlemagne and his successors -with its six "scabini "
or judgment-finders, four judges who read the law, and two advocates
who protected the church. 278 Significantly, twelve, twenty-four, or some
multiple or fraction of twelve, also turns out to be a common number of
board members in the earliest corporations. 279 The council of the Company of the Merchants of the Staple in Calais had twenty -four members,
while the 1505 charter of the Company of Merchant Adventurers authorized the election of twenty-four assistants. 280 Twenty-four was also the
number of assistants in the Russia Company, the number of assistants in
the Eastla nd Company, the number of committees in the East India
Company, and the number of directors of the Bank of England. 281 Beyond the similarities in numbers, there is also similarity in the descriptions of the sort of persons who were to serve on these governing groups.
The earlier discussion of the 1505 charter of the Company of Merchant
Adventurers pointed out how this chart er called for the election of "the
most sadd [sic] discreet and honest persons." 282 Similar language calling

277. See H.W.C. DAVIS,MEDIEVALENGLAND310-1 1 ( 1924).
278 . See MUNDY& RIESENBERG
, supra note 253, at 50. It would also not seem to be a coi ncidence that there are twelve membe rs traditionally on a jury, and that these medieval town councils
often had a judicial function.
279. I SCOTT,supra note 97, at 151.
280. See supra text accompanying note 170.
281. See supra text accompanying notes 96, 121. The 1592 charter of the Levant Company
called for twelve assistants, while both the 1605 charter of this company and the charter of the Massachusetts Bay Company called for eighteen (one and one-half times twe lve) ass istants. Even outliers, such as the seven board members of the Hudson 's Bay Company, or the thirteen members of
the "Council of Virginia" originally governing the London Company, see supra tex t accompanying
notes 105, 132, may simply have come from taking the traditional numbers of twe lve or six and
adding one extra member to avoid tie votes.
282. See supra text accompanying note 175. Similar language exists in the charter of the Russia Company. See supra text accompanying note 125. Interestingly, the charter of the Russia Com-
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for the more "discreet ," "honest" and "sad" persons was often found in
descriptions of appropriate members for English town councils. 283 In addition , the chief executive of the Company of the Merchants of the Staple was called the mayor. 284
3. The Motivations for Town Councils
Given the strong evidence that early corporate boards were either
an imitation of town councils, or at least must have stemmed from similar ideas about governance, examining the reasoning behind the use of
town councils could provide an insight into the motivations for the early
corporations selecting governance through boards. Unfortunately, it
turns out that the motivations behind the use of town councils are themselves subject to considerable uncertainty. The problem is that town
councils arose during a period for which records are scarce. 285 What is
generally accepted is that early medieval towns typically were run under
a representative of the king ,286 a local noble, 287 or the clergy. 288 We also
know, as detailed above, that towns in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries increasingly had councils. Unfortunately, the evidence is limited
as to exactly how and why municipal government traveled from this beginning point to this end point.
As discussed above , the creation of the Ipswich council gives us an
example for which documentation is relatively complete as compared
with other towns. The Ipswich chronicler mentions three organs of town
government: the officers (the two bailiffs and four coroners); the council
of twelve chief portmen; and the assembly of the town acting as a whole ,
which elected the officers and decided to have a council of chief portmen. The existence of these three organs of town government suggests

pany, in additio n to establishing a board of twenty-four assista nts, also ca lled for the elec tion of four
"co nsuls." As discusse d earlier, the title "co nsul " comes from Italian mun icipal governments. See
supra text acco mpany ing note s 253 , 258.
283. PLAIT, supra note 245, at 119 (quo ting language which called for the "more hone st and
discree t," the "more discree t and fit," or the "wiser and sadder " to serve on town councils).
284. See supra text accompanying not e 166.
285 . THOMPSON
, ECONOMICANDSOCIALHISTORY,sup ra note 254, at 766.
286. Engli sh town s, as mentioned above, commonly had an offic ial called a reeve, who was
respon sible to the king for co llecting taxes and had the ch ief vo ice in the town. PLATT, supra note
245 , at 132. Incidentally, when such an official was appoin ted for a shire , he was known as the shire
reeve , or sheriff.
287 . Medieval nobl es com monly exerc ised control over villages by having jurisdiction in the
noble 's court to hear almost all crim inal and civ il cases invol ving the inhabitant s of villages within
the noble ' s territory . See SWANSON,supra note 244 , at 74.
288 . In Germany , bishops typicall y were the lord of the town. See Rorig, supra note 243, at 19,
22.
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that the burgesses of Ipswich had, generally speaking, three evident
choices for municipal governance. They could simply have had the officers (which was all that the charter comrnanded). 289They could have had
the officers coupled with assemblies of the whole town. Instead, they
chose a third alternative--officers coupled with a town council. Using
the language of corporate or business governance, the burgesses chose
governance by a board, rather than governance solely by managing executives, or a partnership style scheme of all members of the community
participating in management. The principal reason the Ipswich burgesses
gave for making this choice is that other free boroughs had such councils; but this rationale simply forces us to ask why other towns had created councils. As illustrated by the alternatives facing Ipswich, the broad
question, in tum, breaks down into two subsidiary inquires: Why have a
council rather than assemblies of the whole town? And, why have a
council rather than having governance solely by executive officials?
Historians have propounded a number of explanations for towns
choosing a council over assemblies of all of the burgesses. One set of
explanations consists of relatively benign practicality concerns. These
include the Jack of interest by all of the burgesses in attending town assemblies,290the notion (which is rather elitist) that many of the burgesses
lacked the knowledge or judgment necessary to make quality decisions,291and the simple logistical problems entai led in holding meetings
with increasing numbers of participants. 292Needless to say, these concerns remain the reasons often still expressed for centralized versus part-

289. At first glan ce, one might be tempted to equate the four coroners of Ipswich as being
somet hing of a board. Later sources suggest, how ever , that the purpo se of having a number of persons as coroners (or in sim ilar positions) was not to have group action, as in a board, but rather to
allow bu sy burgesses (who might need to travel out of town on trad e) to rotate who among the four
would carry out the responsibilities of the offi ce. SWANSON,supra note 244, at 9 1.
290. See LORRAINE ATTREED, THE KING'S TOWNS: IDENTITY AND SURVIVAL IN LATE
MEDIEVALENGLISHBOROUGHS18 (2001). Support for this rationalization comes from some of the
medieval documents establishing town councils, which contain passages that explain suc h action
was necessary because of poor attendance at assemblies, and that adopt requirements for co uncil
members to take an oath that they will attend meetings. See REYNOLDS,supra note 190, at 191-92.
291. See CLARK & SLACK,supra note 251, at 128 (quoting complaint s by the magi st rates of
Gloucester about the difficulties of dealing in any matter "w here the multitud e of burgesses have
voice"); PLATT,supra note 245, at 120 (quo ting complaints directed at assemblies in Leicester and
Northa mpton whe re "grea t trouble" ostensibly resulted "by rea son of the multitude of the inhabitants being of little substa nce and of no discr etion, who exceed in the assemblies the other approved,
disc reet , and well disposed per sons").
292. See I JOHN P. DAVIS, CORPORATIONS:A STUDYOF THE ORIGIN AND DEVELOPMENTOF
GREAT BUSINESSCOMBINATIONSAND OF THEIR RELATION TO AUTHORITYOF THE STATE, 112
(1905). The fact that sma ller towns retained open assemblies supports this as a factor. REYNOLDS,
supra note 190, at 196.
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nership style management in the modern business corporation with numerous shareholders. 293 Other historians take a less benign view, finding
the use of councils to be a mechanism for oligarchies of wealthier merchants to freeze lower classes out of power. 294
The other question is why the burgesses did not just leave the executive officials (the bailiffs and coroners) in charge of the town. After
all, such an action both would have avoided the practicality problem s
with assemblies, and would have allowed an oligarchy of wealthier burgesses to cut others out of power . Perhaps the explanation is simply that
all the wealthier burgesses , while desiring to cut the poorer townsfolk
out of power , wished to preserve their own voice in municipal governance. If true, this would be consistent with the notion that boards (if they
have the same motivation as town councils) exist so that larger shareholders can elect themselves to a position in which they can protect their
interests. 295 Yet, if the town councils existed solely to provide a direct
voice for the powerful members of the community, then one might expect the number on the council to equal the number of person s with both
influence and a desire to have such a voice. In this event, the size of the
councils ought to be all sorts of numbers reflecting the random number
of persons of influence in various communities . Instead, what one finds,
293. See supra text accompanying notes 27-43.
294. See PLATT,supra note 245 , at 119-24 ; see also REYNOLDS,
sup ra note 190, at 191 (stat ing
that until recently almost all historians had viewed the repla cement of assemblies with town councils as a "ploy designed by the domin ant patriciate to entrench its power." a thesis Professor Reynolds rejects). While such debates over motivations are typical, and often irresolvable , grist for historica l scholarship, an added complication with the establishment of town counci ls is that it is often
unclear precisely wha t form of governance the medieva l town council replaced. A traditional. and
perhaps romantic, narrative views counc ils as represe ntin g a deviat ion from ear lier gove rnance in
which the towns opera ted through assemblies of the whole. Id. In a way, the Ipsw ich chronicle supports this story , as an assembly of the town crea ted the counci l, as well as took a variety of other
steps to get the borough organized. Moreover , unless one assumes that the idea o f calling an asse mbly of the town occurred to the Ipsw ich burge sses out of th in air, one might imagine that governance
through such assemblies could have been occurring before the town received its charter (at least
insofar as the matters addressed by the assem bly did not intmde into topics (taxes) of interest to the
reeve or local noble). See REYNOLDS,IDEAS,supra note 265, at ch. VII, p. 6. If one accepts this
narrative, then the choice by the burgesses of Ipsw ich (as well as other such towns) to shift from
governa nce by officia ls and open assemblies, to governa nce by officials and town councils , presaged the much later decisions by the Merchants of the Staple and the Merchant Adventurers similarly to shift from having a mayor (for the Merchants of the Staple) or governor (for the Merchant
Adve nturers), plus assemb lies of the whole memb ership , to having a mayor or governor , plus a
council or a board of assistants. An alterna te narrative, however, views the counci l as having taken
over directly from the previous contro l by noble, king or clergy. See STEPHENSON
, supra note 245,
at 40, 174. Under this view, the assembly of the town in Ipswich simply wou ld have been an
convocatio n to provide formal accepta nce of a governing counc il whose existence may well have
predated the charter.
295. See supra text accompany ing notes 36-4 1.
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as pointed out before , is that town councils commonly consisted of
twelve, or some multiple or fraction of twelve , members. This use of
symbolically significant numbers sugges ts that town counci ls, like medieval parliaments , were a reflection of medieval European political
ideas concerning the need for collective governance by representatives
(even if the representatives are not from the entire town , but only from
the wealthier inhabitants).
One plau sible explanation for having a town council, rather than
just executi ve officials, comes from the tasks assigned to the council. In
the middle of empowering the council to govern and maintain the borough and to do whatever shou ld be done for the well-being and honor of
the town-all quite undefined - the one specific function assigned the
Ipswich council , according to the chronicler , is to "render judgments"
for the town. This parallel s the initial task of the echev ins of Saint-Omer,
which was to judge cases involving the burgesses of the town. As reflected in these two examples, one of the primary roles of the early town
councils was to adjudicate disputes (especially mercantile disputes) .296
Accordingly, an underlying philosophy behind the establishment of town
council s in lieu of governance solely by executive officials was a preference for collecti ve determination s of contested matters in adjudi cation .297This, of cour se, is still the preference reflected in the continuing
right to trial by jury. To the extent that some of the function of the parliament s in medieval European kingdoms wa s adjudication of disputes,298this philosophy also partially explains the establishment of such
parliament s. To what extent then doe s this function pertain to the corporate board of directors? The medieval preference for adjudicative decisions by a group rather than an individual seems to support Professo r
Bainbridge's ration alizat ion of corporate boards as ju stified by the superiority of grou p decisions in matt ers of judgment 299
-eve n if mediev al
European socie ties had not formally studied psycholo gy. On the other
hand, the que stion of whether a group is better able to eva luate evidence
presented in an adjudication (say to d etermine whether the evidence
proves O.J. killed Nico le, just to give an example) may or may not be
the same as whether a group is better able to eva luate a prospective
296. See Rorig, supra note 243, at 16 1.
297. See Reyno lds, supra note 190, at 23-34. The reintroduc tion of Roman law in the twelfth
century led to the increasing use of single presiding judges in lieu of adjud icat ion by collective
groups, as had bee n characteristic of earlier medieval Europe. Resistance to this trend occurred in
the preserva tion of trial by jury in Eng land, and , significantly for purposes of this Article, in mercantile matters, where asse mblies or gro ups of merchants contin ued to try disputes. Id. at 51-58.
298. See supra text accompanying note 210.
299. See supra text accompanying note s 30-3 l.
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corporation. The earlier discussion of medieval European parliaments
also noted that each member of the parliament represented and bound
the particular corporate group (such as a town) that sent the representative .306This is different from the concept of representation entailed in a
corporate board elected at large by all the owners. Interestingly , the medieval European town councils straddled both concepts of representation. Members in many medieval town councils were chosen by, and
presumably represented, geographic divisions of the town (wards) or the
particular corporate groups within the town (individual guilds). 307The
Ipswich chronicle, however, describes the chief portmen , although selected from different parishes, as having full power to represent the entire town, rather than each representing his individual parish. Since there
is no indication that the portmen (rather than the bailiffs and coroners)
were the agents of the town in dealing with outsiders, the representation
by the chief portmen of the entire town is the same concept as the representation of the entire shareholders by a board elected at large . All told,
whether democratically elected or not, whether representing different
parts of the town or not, the town council was representative insofar as it
existed to fulfill the function of providing consent on behalf of the whole
town when assemblies became impractical.
Significantly, the need for this concept of representation appears to
flow in substantial measure from medieval ideas of collectives as corporations. As discussed earlier, medieval towns operated in such a fashion
and assumed such an identity that they became a corporate entity (what
medieval jurists referred to as a "universitates") , even before fifteenth
century towns in England sought formal status as a "corporation ."308
Both in popular conception, and in juristic theory, this existence as a

306. See supra text accompanying note 223.
307. See MUNDY& RIESENBERG, supra note 253, at 79-80.
308. See BLACK,supra note 254, at 24, 49-53. Just as there are different conce pts of the corporation, as discussed earlier , there are also difference s in termin ology. The term "corpo ration " stems
from a metaphor to a human body. See REYNOLDS,IDEAS,supra note 265, at ch. VI, p. 12. Indeed,
the charter of the East India Compan y referred to the com pan y as a "body corporate. " See supra text
accompanying notes 137-39; CAWSTON& KEANE, supra note 116, at 87. This metaphor of a gro up
as a body assumed greater significance as late- and pos t-medieval lawyers and j udges started viewing rights, such as holding property or appearing in court, as only being avai lable to persons (including state -created corporate persons), and not simply to groups. See REYNOLDS,IDEAS, supra note
190, at ch. VI, p.12. lt was this view that provo ked late medieval municipalities to seek charters
making them corporatio ns in the sense of a fictitious person created by an act of the state. Universitales comes from the Roman Law universilas, wh ich encompa ssed a variety of associations known
as collegia (co lleges), corpora (bodies) and sodalirares, and reflected the Roman Law and ear lier
medieval European tradition that groups, and not just persons, co uld hold property and have lega l
IONSIN PERSPECTIVE§65 (1976).
rights . ALFREDF. CONARD,CORPORAT
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corporate entity carried within it certain nonns as to governance. One
norm, which formed a basis for the towns' claims to self-government,
was that the members of a corporative collective were entitled to make
their own rules as to the internal affairs of the collective. 309 The other
norm, which is central to the present discussion, is that such collectives
made decisions by common consent, in other words, by the consent of
all of the members of the collective. 310 Ideally , this meant unanimous
consent of all of the members of the collective .31 1 Practicality, however,
dictated compromise with this ideal. Hence, there could be majority rule
in case of irreconcilable disagreement, 312 and, critically here , there
should be a council of representatives if open assemblies become impractical. 313
This leads to the question of what was the origin of these corporate
norms, particularly regarding consent through representation. The political historian, Antony Black , traces the medieval European corporate
norm of common consent through a council of representatives, to three
sources. 314 One source consists of Roman ideas of republican rule. Of
course, a skeptic might wonder how much influence of Roman republican writers, such as Cicero, could have had on medieval thinking , since
Rome itself had not been a republic for five hundred years before its fall.
Still, especially for Italian cities, Roman republican sources could have
provided a handy reinforcement in support of those seeking governance
through representative councils. Germanic traditions provide a second
possible source. On the tribal level, early German tribes operated
through popular assemblies in which all members had a duty to attend.
As suggested earlier, 3 15 this tradition presumably also played a role in
leading to the medieval parliaments . Another Germanic tradition involved the guilds . Because the early guilds constituted entirely voluntary
associations unable to coerce dissenting members , they were almost of
necessity governed by common consent. Christian ideas of community ,
as practiced by Church organizations , provided a third source for the
309. BLACK, supra note 254, at 25 (citing the medieval jurist, Bartolu s, for the propo sition that
any univcrsita tes 'ca n make rules about its own affairs'); see id. at 52 (applying this prop os ition to
the towns' claim s for self gove rnment) . Ironically, while towns might point to their corporate statu s
as universitates in order to ju stify their claims to self-gove rnmen t, guild s also cou ld point to their
status as universitates in order to claim a right to regulate their trade in contraven tion of city laws.
fd. at 25 (citing the medieva l ju rist, Baldus).
3 10. See id. at 53.
31 1. See REYNOLDS, supra note 190, at 190.
312. See BLACK, supra note 254, at 61.
313. See id. at 25.
3 14. See id. at 53-65.
315. See supra note 2 16.
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norm of common consent. We shall look at the guilds and Church organizations in some detail below.
If town councils incorporate notions of collective decision-making
and representation, do they also embody the supremacy over executive
officers called for under the current board-centered approach to corporate governance? Medieval European municipalities varied as far as
whether the council appointed town officials , such as the mayor. 316In
any event, municipal constitutions calling for the appointment of the
mayor or other executive officials by town councils may have been more
a means to cut broader assemblies out of the process than a means to ensure council control over executive officials. 317Indeed, there seems to be
little evidence that medieval Europeans viewed the role of the town
council in a manner parallel to the current notion that corporate boards
exist principally as a tool to monitor management. Interestingly , for example, the Ipswich chronicle states that one of the tasks of the four coroners (rather than the chief portmen) was to "superintend the acts of the
bailiffs ."318Finally , it is worth noting that if monitoring town officials
against corruption was one of the purpose s of town council s, the evidence suggests that town councils were not very successful in the undertaking.319In fact, perhaps the early failures of town councils to prevent
corruption by municipal officials should have been seen as a harbinger
of the perennial failure of corporate boards as a monitoring tool, all the
way to Enron .
C.

Guilds

Medieval Europe had numerous fraternal organizations referred to
by a variety of labels, among the most common of which is "guild."320
Many were simply social or religious fraternities organized for communal feasting and drinking and mutual defen se and support .321 Of greater

3 16. See R EYNOLDS, IDEAS, supra note 265, at ch. Xlll , p. 50; SWANSON, xupra note 244, al
80.
3 17. See PLAIT, .rnpra note 245, at 120.
318. S TEPHENSON, supra note 245, at 175. On the other hand, the notion that the coroners
themse lves were acting as some sort of monitoring board wou ld seem undermined by the fact that
the two bailiffs were a lso two of the four coroners.
3 19. See C LARK & S LACK, supra note 25 1, at 132-33. The com plaint that management ofien
controls current corporate boards by limiting the directors' access to infonn ation, see supra text
accompanying note 54, finds its parall el in the observation that secrecy by the mayor and other civic
offic ials kept the city councils of seventeenth century England in the dark. See id. at 13 1.
320. See R EYNOLDS, supra note 190, at 72. Th e term "gu ild" (also spelled "gild") probab ly
comes from the German "geld" as in money paid in for dues. B ALDWIN, sup ra note 254, at 55.
32 1. See H.W.C . DAV IS, supra note 277, at 300-0 1.
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relevance here are guilds with more of an economic focus. Historians
typically divide these economically oriented, or trade, guilds into two
types: craft guilds and merchant guilds. 322
There is a direct relationship between the governance of medieval
European guilds and of the early trading companies. This is because the
early trading companies, such as the Merchant Adventurers, were in
large measure little more than merchant guilds themselves, which then
evolved into the joint stock companies, all the while continuing the tradition of board governance. Moreover, working backwards even further,
the precedent setting adoption of board governance by the Company of
Merchant Adventurers in its 1505 charter seems to have been an outgrowth of the Merchant Adventurers' relationship with a merchant guild
known as the Mercers Company.
The Mercers Company was a guild of London merchants. 323 In the
mid-fourteenth century, an assembly of London merchants adopted a
code of rules for the Mercers Company, which, among other things, provided for the annual selection of four masters to govern the group. The
Mercers received their first royal charter in 1393. The charter granted the
Mercers the corporate attributes of perpetual existence and the right to
hold property. 324 The 1393 charter also empowered the membership to
elect annually four wardens to supervise the company. 325 It is unlikely,
however, that either the four masters or the four wardens constituted a
board as such. Instead, it is likely that these masters or wardens functioned as executive officers, with the multiple number allowing a rotation of responsibilities in order to avoid overburdening merchants busy
with their own business, 326 and with significant decisions left for assem322. See id. Reality , however, often belied the notion of a neat divi sion between guilds of
craftsmen or artisans, who made things, and guilds of merchant s, who bought and sold things. For
example , the so-called guild merchant of the early English towns may have included butchers, bakers, carpenters , masons, and all sorts of other craftsmen, who later fonned craft guilds. See
SALZMAN,supra note 167, at 71.
323. Indeed , the name "mercer," comes from the Latin, "me rcator ," meaning merchant. Evidencing the clos e relationship between merchant guilds and medieval town government, the Mercers boast that the first two mayors of London in the early thirt eenth century were Mercers. See P.H.
DITCHFIELD,THE CITY COMPANIESOF LONDONAND THEIR GOOD WORKS: A RECORDOF THEIR
HISTORY, CHARITYANDTREASURE18 ( 1904).
324 . As discussed earlier , see supra text accompanying note 264, the purpose of seeki ng this
charter was probably to allow the company to hold property despite the prohibition on mortmain,
which legislation, in 139 1, extended to reach towns and guilds that lacked charter s expressly empowering property ownership in perpetuity.
, supra note 323, at 19.
325. See DITCHFIELD
326. See supra note 289 (discussing the practi ce of med ieval towns electing four coroners in
order to allow burgesses , who were busy with travel and business , to rotate who would carry out the
duties of the office).
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blies of the general membership whenever needed. One reason for reaching this conclusion is because, in 1463, the Mercers changed their governance structure to introduce what is clearly a board. Declaring that it
was "odious and grievous " to hold many meetings of the membership,
especially "for matters of no great effect," the membership of company
passed a resolution that called for the election every year of twelve "sad
and discreet" members to be assistants to the wardens. 327 The function of
the assistants was to make decisions jointly with the wardens that all
members of the guild would follow- in other words , to replace general
assemblies with representative group decision-making.
Two facts establish the connection between the Mercer s' action in
1463 and the board governance provision found four decade s later in the
charter of the Merchant Adventurers. 328 One is the obvious similarity in
the two boards: Members of both boards had the title of assistants. While
the Mercers board contained twelve members, and the Merchant Adventurers had twenty-four , twelve or twenty-four , as discussed earlier, 329
were the traditional numbers of members on medieval town councils.
Further , in both cases, we see the same sort of language about the nature
of persons to serve ("sad and discreet") . The second fact is even more
telling. As discussed earlier ,330 at the time of the 1463 Mercer s' resolution, the London merchants engaged in export of manufactured goods
(merchant adventurers) were a part of the Mercer s Compan y, insofar as
they formed any group at all. 331 Hence, in establishing board governance, the 1505 charter of the Company of Merchant Adventurer s was
simply continuing to use a structure under which the London-based merchant adventurers, as part of the Mercers , already operated. 332

32 7. See DITCHFIELD, supra note 323, at 20 ; O' Donnell , supra note 96, at 63 .
32 8. For a discussion o f the 1505 charter of the Merchant Adventurers, see supra text accompanying notes 179, 241 , 280.
329. See supra text accompan ying note s 251 .
330. See supra text accompa nying not e 174.
33 1. In fact, des;,ite the 1505 charter, the Merc hant Adventurers kept their minutes in the same
book with the Mercers' until 1526 . See C HEYNEY, sup ra note 172, at 166.
332. A somew hat si milar conn ecti on may exis t between the London-bas ed Grocer s C ompany,
the Levant Company, and, in tum , the East India Compan y. The Grocers-w hich probably began as
a guild of merchants that dealt at whol esale (en gros), see Ditchfield, supra note 323, at 34, elec ted
a board of si x ass istant s as earl y as 1397. See LUJO BRENTANO, ON THE HISTORY AND
DEVELOPMENTOF GILDS AND THE ORIGIN OF T RADE-UNIONS62 ( 1870). The Leva nt Compa ny appear s to have been related to the G rocers, as evidenced by the Levant Company's use of the Grocers' hall for the Levant Company 's meeting s until 1666. I DAVIS, supra note 292, at 224 . The East
India Co mpan y, in tum , used the boo ks of the Levant Company for the East India Company 's initial
organizati onal meetings. Id. Indeed, the origins of the East Indi a Co mpany in earlier guilds reve rberat ed for many years in the continuati on by the East India Co mpany of various guild traditions,
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Given that the guilds are the most direct source for the use of
boards in the early trading companies, the question becomes why did the
guilds themselves adopt the use of boards. As suggested by the earlier
discussion of medieval town councils, 333 municipal government probably influenced guild government. 334 Nevertheless, it would oversimplify
the origins of corporate boards to view the guilds simply as a conduit
that imitated town councils, and then, by turning into the early trading
companies, established the pattern for later corporate boards. This is because, as also mentioned earlier, 335 it is possible as well to view the
guilds as one of the sources leading to the medieval European towns' use
of councils. In other words, guilds and towns were inexorably linked in a
relationship in which ideas and practices traveled both ways, and that, in
tum, reflected a broader set of political ideas and practices also spurring
the use of parliaments in medieval Europe.
To understand the development of boards in the medieval guilds, it
helps to start by asking what sort of decisions and tasks were involved in
the governance of the guilds. Probably the most important decisions
were the admission of new members 336 and the adoption of ordinances
governing the members' conduct. 337 Collection and appropriate use of
funds from the members meant that there was a need for financial administration. 338 Significantly, guilds also commonly sought to resolve
disputes involving their members, which, in turn, led the merchant
guilds often into performing the role of a sort of mercantile court. 339
In their early years, the guilds made these decisions and carried out
these tasks through a governance structure consisting of a combination
of executive officers and general meetings of all the membership .340 Significant decisions, including admission of new members and the adopinclud ing calling shareholders "b rothers " and requiring the y take oath s of memb ership . I SCOTI,
supra note 97 , at 152.
333 . See supra text accompanying notes 271-77, 303-07.
334. See BLACK, supra note 254, at 58 ("craft gui lds not infrequently used the pattern of city
gove rnment as a model").
335. See supra text acco mpanying notes 266, 307.
336. See I DAVIS,suprano te292 , at 152-53.
33 7. Such ordinances often addresse d personal behavior so as to promote the members' living
a virtuous life. See BALDWIN,supra note 254, at 56-57. In the craft and merc hant guilds, the ordinances typically regulated the quality of goods and honesty in dealin gs. I DAVIS, supra note 292, at
310.
338. See I DAVIS,supra note 292 , at 304.
339. See SWANSON,supra note 244 , at 77.
340. A long similar lines, medieval European univer sities, such as at Bologna , Pari s and Oxford, followed a governance model based upon general assemblie s of students (the Bologna model)
or masters (the Paris model) , who elected officers (rec tors and the like). See LOWRIE J. DALY,THE
MEDIEVALUNIVERSITY 1200- 1400, at 30-75 (196 1).
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tion of ordinances to regulate the guild, occurred at meetings of all the
membership. These meetings, often called a "morgensprache" (morning
speech), occurred at least annually and often were accompanied by
ceremonies and festivities. 341 Commonly , the guild members at the annual morgensprache elected officers for the guild. 342 Among the tasks of
the chief officer(s) of the guild would be presiding over the morgensprache, caring for the guild's property, collecting fees due the guild, enforcement of the guild's ordinances, and attempting to settle disputes between members of the guild. 343 On the other hand, if the enforcement of
an ordinance, or the resolution of a dispute , required adjudication, then
the matter commonly went before the whole membership at the morgensprache. 344
While, at the early stage, the guild governance structure contained
nothing like a board of directors, this early governance structure is nevertheless significant to the history of the corporate board. To begin with,
the early guild governance structure, consisting of general membership
meetings and elected executive officials, appears to parallel the governance structure of both the Company of the Merchants of the Staple and
the Company of Merchant Adventurers before these two early trading
companies adopted board governance. 345 In other words, these two early
trading companies evolved in their governance in same manner as many
guilds evolved in the guilds' governance. This further evidences the link
between the development of board governance in guilds and its development in the early trading companies.
In addition, the early guild tradition of decisions by general assemblies made an important contribution to the ultimate development of
boards. This is because, as mentioned earlier when discussing the motivations for the development of town councils, 346 guild practices were
one of the sources for the idea that decisions impacting an entire collective group required the consent of all in the group. At the earliest time,
when guilds were probably more fraternal organizations for drinking and
34 1. See BLACK,supra note 254, at 24.
342. See I DAVIS,supra note 292 , at 152. Guilds varied in the titles and roles of such officers.
The Ipswich chronicle describes the election of an aldem1an to head the guild merchant for the
town, with four others to assist. See supra text accompanying notes 273-77. As discussed above, the
Mercers elected four individuals, at first called masters, and later called wardens, to be the executive
officers for the guild. The Calimala Guild (the guild of the cloth merchants) in Florence had four
consu ls and a treasurer as its senior executive officers. See EDGCUMBE
STALEY,THE GUILDSOF
FLORENCE117 ( 1906).
343. See I DAVIS, supra note 292 , at 152.
344. See id. at 153.
345. See supra text accompanying note 163.
346. See discussion supra Part IV.B.3.
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mutual aid and defense, than for coordinated economic activity, the principle of unanimous consent may have been the result of simple practi347
calities-if someone did not like the decision, they could leave.
Moreover, the basic notion of a brotherhood, whose members shared festivities and looked out for each other, seems intuitively more conducive
to collective and consensus-based decision-making, than it is to a command-oriented hierarchical govemance. 348 Over time, however, what
started as simple practicality, or intuitive notions of brotherhood , became embedded in custom and norm- and even could influence Canon
Law jurists to tum a Roman Law doctrine of quod omnes tangit ab omnibus approbetur ("what touches all is to be approved by all") from a
technical rule into a broad principle of governance. This, in tum, meant
that when general assemblies became impractical in guilds or towns,
some institution was needed to step in and give consent on behalf of the
overall community. In the case of towns, this institution was the town
council. As suggested by the discussion of the Mercers Company , in the
case of the guilds, this institution was also a council or a board of assistants.
The switch by guilds to using boards occurred gradually across
Europe. In Italy, fourteenth century Florentine guilds provide examples
of the use of complex systems of councils that mirrored the complexity
of Florentine city govemment. 349 Guilds in some German cities had six
or eight person councils by the fourteenth century. 350 In England, a merchant guild council of twenty-four members (who were virtually the
same persons who served on the twenty-four member town council) existed at Leicester in the mid thirteenth century. 351 Documents of London's Grocers Company record the selection in 1397 of six persons to
aid the wardens in the discharge of their duties. 352 By and large, however, the move by the guilds toward the use of boards of assistants occurred in the fifteenth (as illustrated by the Mercers Company) and sixteenth centuries. 353

347. In a rough way, this is John Locke's social contract theory writ small and in a real world
context.
348. See BLACK,supra note 254, at 57.
349. See STALEY,supra note 342, at 119 (discussing the two councils in the Calima la gu ild).
350. See BRENTANO,supra note 332, at 62 (giving the examples of the Spinwetter guild at
Bale and the Tailors guild of Vienna).
351. See PLATT,supra note 245, at 133.
352. See supra note 332.
, supra note 332, at 62. Indeed , the guild merchant at Ipsw ich appears to
353. See BRENTANO
have had a familiar looking board of twenty-four by the t ime of James I. See l SCOTT, supra note
97, at 7.
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As with the development of town councils, there are different theories as to what prompted the guilds to switch to the use of boards. The
Mercers' resolution suggests that the motive lay in the burden on the
members entailed by holding assemblies for less important matter s. 354
Yet, this raises the question of what were these less important matters
that produced burdensome meetings. Since the matter s that went before
the morgensprache were admission of new members, adoption of ordinances, election of officers, and adjudication of dispute s, and since admission of new members, adoption of ordinances, and election of officers genera lly occurred at the annual morgensprache -which, as an
occasion of festival and ceremony, would take place anyway and presumably would be well attended-it seems that the principal matters that
called for overly frequent meetings would have been the adjudication of
disputes. Hence, it appears that a primary reason for the board of assistants would have been to hear disputes . The parallel with the early town
councils, such as the Ipswich chief portmen or the echevins of SaintOmer, for whom adjudication was a primary task,355 is obvious. Similarly, adjudication of disputes was a function of the board of assistants of
the Merchant Adventurers. 356 In all of these cases, the common ideology
producing boards, which remains reflected in the jury system , is the desire for collective judgment in adjudications.
The a lternate exp lanation for the development of boards of assistants in the guilds also finds a parallel in town councils. Many historians
contend that the boards in the guilds, like the town councils, represented
an attempt by the wealthier members to cut other members out of govemance.357 However, given the custom and norm of collective consent, it
presumably would not have been accepta ble to place entire control in the
guild officers. The solution is the creation of board s of assistants with , as
illustrated by the Mercers' resolution , a symbolically significant number
of twelve (or a multiple or fraction of twelve) members, and with
agreement by the membership to accept the decisions of the board.

354. One can find a reflection of such a burden in the apparent difficulty the guilds had in obtaining attendance at general meeting s. as evidenced by the adoption of quorum requirements, see
BRENTANO,supra note 332, at 61-62, and penalties for non-attendance , see O'Donnell, supra note
96, at 63.
355. See supra text accom panying notes 296-97.
356. See supra text accompanying note 300.
357. See Brentano, supra note 332, at 87-88. Evidence that an oligarchic power grab, rather
than genera l membership complaints about burdensome meetings, may have been beh ind the establishment of boards of assistants includes the eventual replacement of elected boards by selfperpetua ting boards (in which existing board members selec ted new board members), and protests
by members in some of the guilds, such as London's Weavers, about the changes. See id.
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This just leaves the question of the extent to which the boards in the
guilds served to monitor and control the guild's officers. Particularly in
the sixteenth century, the boards of assistants of many of the London
guilds acquired the power to appoint officer s in lieu of appointment by
the membership at the annual meeting. 358 Yet , as sugge sted by the
roughly parallel developments involving English town councils, 359 transfer of the power to elect the guild's officers from general assemblies to
boards of assistants may have been more an effort to shut out the general
membership, than it was an effort to establi sh monitoring by the boards.
Also, as with town councils , when the guilds wanted to delegate monitoring of their officers , they often did this by assigning the task to a
smaller group , rather than to the board of assistants. For example, records of the London -based Grocers guild show the selection of four
auditors "to superintend the accounts and delivery of the wardens." 360
Similarly, monitoring of the consuls and treasurer (the senior executive
officers) of Florence's Calimala guild was the funct ion of three "Sin dacatori" (general inspectors) , rather than the responsibility of either the
twelve person general council or the eighteen person special council of
the guild. 361

D. Church Councils
No discussion of representative bodies in Europe of the Middle
Ages would be complete without reference to the councils in var ious institutions of the Church. Admittedly, there is not the extensive evidence
of linkage between the Church councils and the boards of the early trading companies that one discovers when dealing with the councils of
towns and guilds. Still, given the central role of the Church in medieval
European life and thought , it would be surpri sing if no intellectual commona lity existed between Church councils and trading company boards.
Councils existed on a variety of levels in the western European
Church during the Middle Ages. Pro vincial synods and local church
councils met fairly frequently in some parts of medieval Europe. 362 Of
358. See I DAVIS,supra note 292, at 2 13.
359. See supra text accompanying note 294 .
360. BRENTANO
, supra note 332, at 62.
36 1. See STALEY,supra note 342, at 121.
362. See ANTONYBLACK,COUNCIL AND COMMUNE:THE CONCILIARMOVEMENTANDTHE
FIFTEENTH-CENTURYHERITAGE9 (1979). The degree to which institutions affiliated with the
Church of medieval Western Europe followed a representative governance structure varied. The
Dominican Order, which received papal approbation in 12 16, provides an example of represen tative
governance by an organization within the medieval Churc h. The constitutions of the Dominican
Order contained regulations for daily life and for the government of the Order. There were three
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more far reaching influence were the general councils of the Church.
From the first ecumenica l council convened at Nicaea in 325, councils
occurred among representatives of some or all of the five patriarchal
sees (Constantinople, Rome, Alexa ndria, Antioch and Jerusalem) . These
councils were chiefly concerned with religious doctrine, and recognition
of their pronouncements as authoritative established councils as the
highest authority within the Church on questions of doctrine. 363 An important development in using councils as a tool of governance occurred
in the middle of the eleventh century, when the College of Cardinals obtained the power to elect the Pope. Originally, cardinals were simply certain Roman clergy who performed liturgical functions in the great basilicas, but, in the eleventh century, the College of Cardinals became the
Pope 's close counselors, and, in 1059, Nicholas II issued a decree grant ing the College the power to elect the Pope .364 The immediate motivation for this development was to remove the intervention of lay officials
(such as the Holy Roman Emperor) in the selection of Popes. 365 The
long-range impact, however, was to advance a model of group selection
of a chief official (as in boards and CEOs). It also inevitably raised the
question of whether the power to elect gave the power to remove.
The implications of the power of the College of Cardinals to elect
the Pope came to roost in the so-called Great Schism. A decision of the
College of Cardinals in 1378 to recant their election of Urban VI, and to
elect Clementine VI instead, led to the embarrassing spectacle of two

levels of government - the local convent, the provincial chapter, and the general chapter. The members of each convent elected a prior , who governed along with the friars (members) in accordance
with the constitution and the rules of the Order. The prior and two delegates from each convent in
the province elected the provincial prior and provincial chapter (a governing council). The provincial chapter s, in tum, elected the members of the general chapter (the governing council for the
overall Order). The general chapter had the power to enact legislation changing the regulations governing the Order . The general chapter met annually until 1370, and continued to meet every two or
three yea rs thereafter . Interestingly , in light of later disputes over supre macy of councils versus
Popes, eac h chapter had the power to remove officials at its level. See CARSTENS,s upra note 254, at
25-28 . By contrast, the Benedictine monasteries elected an abbot for life , who was supposed to consult with the monks , but who had the final say in all decisions . See I DAVIS, supra note 292, at 51 ;
BISSO\J, supra note 188, at 141-42. The Franc iscan s also placed greater authority in their executive
officials (particularly the general minister at the head of the order) than the Dominican s, but subjected the officials to reelection at a set term and to removal for cause. See I DAVIS, supra note 292,
at 64.
363. See COL!SH, supra note 234, at 340-41. Following the schism between the Roman and
Greek Churches , councils of the Roman Church, starting with the First Lateran council of 1123,
typically occurred without repre sentatives of the Greek Church.
364. See BRIANTIERNEY,FOUNDATIONSOF THE CONCILIARTHEORY:THE CONTRIBUTION
OF
THEMEDIEVALCANONISTSFROMGRATIANTOTHE GREATSCHISM69-70 (reprint 1968) ( 1955).
365 . See COLISH,supra note 234 , at 341.
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competing lines of Popes (one in Avignon and the other in Rome). 366 After several earlier efforts failed, the Council of Constance in 1414
through 1418 resolved the schism with decrees that appeared to establish
the supremacy of councils within the Roman Church. Not only did the
Council of Constance depose the contenders and arrange for the election
of a new Pope under a procedure designed by the council, it set forth a
decree announcing that, as a legitimately assembled general council ,
everyone of whatever standing or office within the Church, including the
Pope, was bound to obey its order eradicating the schism. Moreover, the
Council of Constance promulgated a second decree calling for regular
councils. 367Constance turned out, however, to be the high point for the
supremacy of councils within the Roman Church. After a later council at
Basel came to naught, Popes failed to call regular councils and effectively reduced the decree from Constance claiming supremacy for councils to cover only the special circumstance of resolving the Great
Schism. 368
Despite its ultimately limited impact on the governance of the
Church itself, the Council of Constance remains important because it
represented a culmination of thought and writings concerning the power
of councils versus Popes (and, inferentially, other governing officials).
Some of this writing and thought deals with issues unique to Christianity
and the constitution of the Church. 369Other writing and thought raises
issues whose political importance could transcend Church governance.
One example is whether election of a governing official by a group
meant that the group also had the power of removal, which, in tum,
raises the question of what is the source of a governing official's authority.370More narrowly , recognizing that human fallibility could afflict
even the highest governing officials, medieval scholars explored the
grounds and procedure for removing an errant Pope. 371Given that these
considerations of Church governance occurred as medieval European
366. See TIERNEY, supra note 364, at 1-2.
36 7. See BLACK,supra note 362, at 17-18.
368. See JOHNN. FIGGIS, STUDIESOF POLITICALTHOUGHTFROMGERSONTO GROTIUS: l 4141625, at 40-42 (2d ed. reprint 1956) (1907).
369. Such as whether statements attributed to Christ delegated authority to the heirs of Saint
Peter (the Popes) or to the whole Church , and the relationship of the Roman See to the whole
Church. See TIERNEY, supra note 364, at 25-36 .
3 70. See id. at 56 (citing the writing of the medieval scholar of Canon Law, Laurenti us, who
drew a distinction between the divine origin of the powers of the offices of Pope or Emperor , and
the selection by human electors of which individuals occupied the offices).
371. This meant laboring to reconcile the doctrine that a heretic could not be Pope , with the
doctrine that only the Pope could judge what was heresy. See id. at 57-64 (discussing the effort of
the medieval scholar of Canon Law, Huguccio, to reconcile the conflict).
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kingdoms had been experimenting with the power of parliamentary assemblies versus kings, historians have debated whether the medieval
scholars of Church governance were drawing upon the political events
occurring around them, or whether the political events were emanating
from ideas developed as part of Church governance under Canon Law. 372
For purposes of this Article, what is most important about the ruminations of scholars in medieval Europe on the powers of Church
councils versus Popes lies in the efforts of these scholars to draw upon
medieval ideas of corporation law-not in the sense of a business corporation, but, as discussed before, in the sense of a collective society,
including towns, guilds, and the Church. Here, we encounter the conflict
between the authoritarian views of Pope Innocent IV-who drew upon
the concept of the Church as a corporation to argue that the power of
decision rested in the head (i.e. the bishop for the local church, or the
Pope for the overall Church)-and the views of the noted thirteenthcentury scholar of Canon Law, Cardinal-bishop Henricus de Segusio
(Hostiensis), who argued that power over a corporation resided both in
the head and in the membership. 373 Amusingly, some of the debate
between proponents of the two schools of thought wanders off into the
metaphor of the corporation as a body. (Indeed, the word "corporation"
derives from the Roman "corpus" as in "body." 374 ) So, those supporting
Innocent IV's position sometimes talk of the power of the head to rule
the body. 375 The arguments of Hostiensis, however, were not metaphorical. Speaking , for example, of the power of a local bishop to
alienate property , Hostiensis noted that this decision could produce a
loss from which the whole of the corporation (the local church) would
suffer. Since this action, therefore, impacted the common welfare, it required the consent of the entire corporation, not just its head. 376 In other
words, we are back to the Roman and Canon Law doctrine of quod
omnes tangit ab omnibus approbetur ("what touches all is to be
approved by all").
372. Compare id. at 18-20 (Canon Law provided the source for conciliar ideas in the Church);
Tierney, supra note 212, at 8-13, 15 (showing that Canon Law principles influenced development of
medieval European parliaments), with FIGGIS, supra note 368, at 33-36 (medieval European parliaments influenced conciliar ideas in the Church).
supra note 364, at 106- 108.
373. See TIER.NEY,
374. See supra note 308.
375. See GIERKE,supra note 232, at 28-29.
376. See TIER.NEY,supra note 364, at 49, 122-24. The concern that bishops, if not required to
gain conse nt, might aliena te local church propeny to the prejudice of the local church suggests a
monitoring function behind the idea of consent. Indeed, the notion that the corpora te group, or its
representatives, needed to keep an eye on potentially misbehaving officials seems to have received a
stronger expression in the Church than with parliaments , town councils, guild councils or trading
company boards. See id. at 123-24.
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The crisis of the Great Schism brought to the fore the role of a representative group, in other words a council, as the means by which the
entire corporate body could act upon a matter that concerned all. As
stated above, long practice had recognized the authoritative nature of the
pronouncements of general councils of the Church on matters of doctrine. Medieval scholars of Canon Law provided a doctrinal explanation
for this recognition by stating that action of general councils provided
the "universal consent" necessary to make decisions on matters touching
"the general state of the Church." 377 This is reminiscent of the summonses, discussed earlier, 378 which called upon English towns and shires
to send representatives to parliaments with plena potestas ("full power ")
to consent to actions of the parliaments, so as to meet the requirement of
quad omnes tangit ab omnibus approbetur ("what touches all is to be
approved by all"). 379 Also, as seen before when dealing with medieval
parliaments and town councils, the concept of representation employed
by the proponents of Church councils did not necessarily entail democratic election. For example, the principal proponents of conciliar power
at Constance-Z abarella, d'Ailly and Gerson-asserted that the power
of acting as a council for the whole Church rested upon those with indi. 1.e.,
. th e b.1sh ops.380
v1'dua 1authonty,
Overall, what emerges from Church councils is additional evidence
for an overarching medieval theory of corporate governance applicable
to kingdoms, the Church, towns and guilds. Under this theory, decisions
impacting the entire corporate collective require consent of the collective. In circumstances in which an assembly of the entire corporate body
is impractical, consent from a group, who are representati ve in a symbolic, even if not a democratically elected, sense, becomes necessary.
The early trading companies applied this overarching ideology in adopting governing boards.

377. See id at 47-53.
378. See supra text accompany ing note 193.
379 . The full power en tailed in the conce pt of p/ena potestas should be distinguished from the
concep t of plenitudo potestatis ("fullness of power ") acco rded to the Pope. At leas t as the later term
grew to be understood , plenitudo po testatis went beyond the notio n that an individual had authority
to represe nt a broader group , and entail ed being both the source of all authority and eve n above the
law. See TIERNEY, supra note 364, at 146-48.
380. See BLACK, supra note 362, at 19-22.
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CONCLUDING THOUGHTS ON THE PURPOSE OF CORPORATE
BOARDS

Having traced the historical and political origins of the corporate
board of directors, the question becomes what can this tell us about the
purpose of corporate boards today . In fact, the history of corporate
boards provide s conflicting evidence with respect to the purposes
claimed by modem scholars for the board-centered model of corporate
governance.
The development of corporate boards , as well as the development
of other representative institutions in the Europe of the Middle Ages, is
consistent with the notion that the use of boards (like other representative institutions in medieval Europe), in part, arose out of problems with
direct governance by groups that have large numbers of members (in
other words , the central management rationale). This is nicely illustrated
by the example of the Levant Company , which had no board when the
company started with four members , but received a new charter providing for a board of twelve assistants when the membership increased. 38 1
Along the same lines , the apparent evolution in some medieval municipalities from governance involving assemblies of all townsfolk, to governance by town councils , occurred as medieval towns grew in population. 382 Yet, if practicalities ruled out governance by the general
membership once the organization reached a certain size, this does not
explain why either trading companies , or towns , guilds, kingdom s or
institutions of the Church , would employ a board , council or parliament ,
rather than an autocratic governance structure under just executive officials . Indeed , representative institutions declined, and autocratic rule increased , in kingdoms , towns and the Church in much of Europe following the Middle Ages. 383
The origins of the corporate board also provid e some support for
Profe ssor Bainbridge 's argument that the reason for board s lies in the
superiority of groups in making decisions involving judgment. As discussed earlier , a common task for town council s, guild council s, parliament s, and early trading company boards was the adjudication of disputes. 384 This seems to reflect the notion that groups are more likely to
get the correct result in ferreting out truth than would an individu al

38 1.
382.
383.
384 .

See supra
See supra
See supra
See supra

text accompanying notes 130-31.
note 292 and text acco mpanying notes 289-92.
text accompa nying notes 259.
text acco mpanying notes 185, 242, 296, 300, 339.
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judge. 385 Also, the tradition of consultation and consensus that formed
386
part of the basis for the development of medieval parliaments seems to
have arisen not just out of ideas of consent, but also out of the feudal obligation of nobles to provide advice to the king. 387 Underlying the obligation to provide advice must be some notion of the superiority of
groups over individuals in making decisions. Nor was the idea that
groups might reach superior decisions over individuals merely implicit
in medieval political thinking. Rather, this concept was a central tenet in
the writings of the noted medieval political philosopher, Marsiglio of
Padua. For example, in his work, Defender of the Peace, Marsiglio argued that the best laws came from the entire collective (universitas
civium) because '"when the whole corporation of citizens is directed towards something with its intellect and sympathy , the truth of that object
is judged more certainly and its common utility weighed more carefully. "' 388 Still, despite all this being said, it is critical to keep in mind
that the proposition that groups, such as boards, make decision s superior
to those made by an individual leader (with, of course, advice) was a
highly contested claim in medieval Europe, as it remains to the present. 389 Indeed, Marsiglio of Padua was condemned as a heretic, and was
390
not that influential at the time he wrote.
It is clear that some representative institutions in medieval Europe
had the purpose, at least in part, of mediating between various constituencies, thus supporting the notion that corporate boards exist in order to
mediate between various corporate claimants. 391 Yet, the medieval representative institutions that had a mediating role, such as the parliaments
and some town councils , contained representatives from various constituencies. 392 So, for example, the French Estates General and provincial Estates take their name from the presence of representatives of three
classes-nobility, clergy, and burghers - that made up medieval society
(at least in the view of the time). 393 By contrast, solely the members of
385. See supra text accompanying notes 297, 299.
386 . See supra text accompanying note 211.
387. See COLTSH,
sup ra note 234 , at 345.
388 . See BLACK,supra note 254, at 93 (quoting MARSIGLTO, THE DEFENDEROF THE PEACE,
DICTIOI).
389. See generally MACHIA
YELL!,THE PRINCE, chs. 5, 6, I 0, 12 (Quent in Skin ner & Russell
Price eds., 1988); THOMASHOBBES,LEVIATHAN
, chs. 19-20 (1976 ed.) ( 165 1).
390. See BLACK,supra note 254, at 86, 95.
391. Albeit, these politica l institutions would have been more focused on mediating over who
would pay how much taxes or the like, than over who would receive how much distributions from a
venture.
392. See supra text accompanying note s 187, 216, 223.
393. See supra text accompanying note 203.
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the company typically elected trading company boards, 394 and there is no
suggestion that such boards represented anyone else. Moreover, the active role often taken by the general membership in the early corporations-as seen in the examples of the Russia Company, 395 and the Virgmia Company (with its quarterly meetings of the general
membership) 396-is inconsistent with the notion that early boards had
any power to act as neutral arbiters in order to protect various stakeholders in the corporate enterprise from the shareholders. Finally, while
shareholders with a larger stake in the venture may well have ended up
on the early boards, the fact that voting in proportion to ownership arose
only later 397 suggests that early boards were not primarily vehicles to ensure that large, albeit non-controlling, shareholders could elect themselves or their nominees to protect their interests.
Significantly, the rationale for corporate boards most favored by
modern scholars-that boards exist to monitor management on behalf of
passive investors-is the rationale that finds the least support in the historical origins of the corporate board. This is because the board-centered
model of corporate governance did not originate in the joint stock company with its passive investors. Instead, it was a form of governance that
the joint stock company inherited when it evolved out of the regulated
companies, like the Merchant Adventurers or Merchants of the Staple. In
such regulated companies, the members each conducted their own businesses, and, hence, hardly needed the protection of a board to monitor
the managers running the company. Instead of having an oversight function, the role of the board in these earliest trading companies was legislative (passing ordinances to regulate the membership) and adjudicative
(hearing disputes involving the members). 398
Of course, the fact that the original boards did not have a monitoring function on behalf of passive investors does not mean that the board
did not evolve into this primary responsibility as the regulated companies evolved into the joint stock companies. History and biology are replete with institutions and organisms that originated with one purpose
and then successfully migrated into a different function. Yet, as discussed at the beginning of this Article, the record of the board as an in-

394. See supra text accompanying note I 07.
395. See supra text accompanying notes 123-27.
396 . See supra text accompanying notes I 05-11.
397. For example , in the case of the East India Company, voting in proportion to ownership
arose a half century , or perhaps even a century , after the company began. See supra text accompanying note s 155-62.
398. See supra text accompanyin g note 179.
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stitution to monitor management on behalf of passive shareholders has
not been one of unmitigated success .399 Perhaps the historical origin of
the corporate board helps explain why. Specifically , since the board was
not designed originally as a monitoring tool, one should not be totally
surprised if boards tum out not to be all that effective as a means to
monitor management. Moreover, the political origins of the corporate
board suggest a further problem boards faced when they evolved into a
tool to monitor management. Medieval political thinking contained an
unresolved tension between preferences for hierarchical versus collective decision-making. 400 Most especially, as witnessed in the events before and after the Council of Constance, the issue of whether a representative body could call the Pope, king or other chief official to account,
was highly contested. 401 Of course, the legal issue of the corporate
board's power over the CEO is now resolved beyond all doubt in the
board's favor.402 Nevertheless, the norm of deference to the CEO that
pervades corporate board culture renders boards reluctant to assert their
supremacy. 403 Might it be fair to speculate that at least some of this hesitancy reflects the awkward melding of hierarchical and representative
ideas lingering still from the medieval political heritage of the corporate
board?
While the historical and political origins of the corporate board of
directors provide conflicting evidence regarding the various purposes
modem commentators claim for the board, these origins suggest a critical function which modem commentators seem to have overlooked. This
function is providing political legitimacy. The unifying theme behind
medieval parliaments, town councils, guild councils, councils of the
Church, and the boards of the trading companies, is that they provided
the means to comply with the "corporate law" rule that "what touches all
shall be consented to by all," in circumstances when consent by assembly of the entire group was impractical. 404 While the rationale for this
rule of consent may have included the notion that wiser decisions result
from consent of the entire group (or at least from a group of representatives), or that the requirement of consent by all (or the representatives of
all) allowed various constituents to protect their interests, or that the requirement of consent served as a check on possible misdeeds of the

399.
400.
40 I.
402.
403.
404.

See
See
See
See
See
See

supra
supra
supra
supra
supra
supra

text accompanying
text accompanying
tex t accompanying
text accompanying
text accompanying
text accompanying

notes 55-58.
note 233.
notes 366- 72.
notes 24-25.
notes 68-80.
notes 238 -41.
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ruler, there al so seems to be the notion that legitimate authority require s
consent, regardless of the impact of consent on the quality of decisions
and governance.
Indeed, once we start looking at the role of the board in terms of
political legitimacy, it is possible to identify the achievements of the institution, and the reasons for its continued existence , despite a rather
modest record in terms of achieving goals of wealth maximization and
business efficiency. An irony of the development of the trading company
boards is that this occurred as representative political institutions were
waning in Europe. At the end of the Middle Ages, parliamentary assemblies receded in the face of the growing power of monarchs in Spain and
France , and princes in Italy and Germany. 405 After Constance, Papal authority grew triumphant over councils in the Church. 406 Town council s
fell in favor of princes in Italian cities , and royal bureaucrats in
France. 407 Hence, an unheralded achievement of corporate boards may
have been to help preserve medieval traditions of representative institutions at a time when those institutions were under siege elsewhere.
Moreover, not only did the trading company board s help preserve medieval political ideas of governance involving representative institutions ,
the trading companies also spread those ideas into new political venues.
Of particular importance for an American law review article, it is worth
recalling the discussion earlier of the role of the Massachusett s Bay and
Virginia companies in transplanting a board governance model into colonial political institutions. 408
It is also possible to recognize the importance of the political legitimacy provided by the corporate board of directors when one considers the nineteenth century history of American corporate law. One of the
common themes of this history is the concern of state governments and
political leaders about the power of corporations. 409 For example, in contrast to worrying about undercapitalized corporations, New York's pioneering general incorporation law limited the maximum amount of capital corporations could raise to $100,000. 410 Image in this light, the
reaction of legislatures asked to enact general incorporation statutes had
the governance model for such entities explicitl y provided that un-

405.
406 .
407 .
408.
409 .

See supra
See supra
See supra
See supra
See Louis

text accompany ing notes 195-207 .
text accompanying notes 367 -68.
text accompany ing notes 255 , 259.
text accompa nying notes 117-18.
K. Liggett Co. v. Lee, 288 U.S. 5 17, 548-56 (1933) (Brandeis , J. dissenting) ;
LAWR ENCE FRIEDMAN, A HI STORY OF AMERI CAN L AW 188-99 (2d ed. 1985).
4 10. liggell Co., 288 U.S . at 55 1 (Brandeis , J. dissenting).

172

HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW

(Vol. 33:89

elected, unaccountable, managers would have control over this economic
power.411
In an era, like the present, in which it is popular to talk of the corporation as nothing more than a "nexus of contracts,',412 commentators
might dismiss a role for the board in providing political legitimacy, as
mistakenly treating corporations like little "republic[s)." 413 Yet, to dismiss the goal of political legitimacy is to ignore the history of the corporation and of the board of directors. The question thus becomes: Have
attitudes toward corporations and corporate boards so changed that the
goal of political legitimacy is no longer relevant. If so, then one might
conclude that the corporate board of directors is a largely useless, if
mostly harmless, institution carried on out of inertia (in other words, the
corporate equivalent of tonsils). Indeed, the original draft of this Article,
presented at a corporate law roundtable jointly sponsored by U.C.L.A.
and the University of Southern California, suggested this conclusion.
Yet, in presenting the paper at the roundtable, I found myself viscerally
uncomfortable with this position. In asking myself why, I realized that it
is because I am a product of a culture which includes, among its values,
the ideas of consent and representation that arose in medieval European
political institutions and are still reflected in the corporate board of directors today. I confess that, as a shareholder, I practice rational apathy
and trash proxy statements. Yet, I favor proposals (even broader than
those recently floated by the Securities Exchange Commission414 ) to require corporate proxies to include the name of director candidates nominated by shareholders-not because I expect any improvement in corporate performance, but because this is more consistent with democratic
ideals.415 What this suggests is that the reason the board of directors endures is because human beings, even in the business context, do not divorce their notions of how to run a business from their broader political
411. I must thank my research assistant, Thomas Clark, who had been a professor of American
history before deciding to come to law school, for raising the question of whether the legitimating
function of the corporate board might have been particularly important during the move to general
incorporation acts.
412. Eugene F. Fama , Agency Problems and the TheotJ' of the Firm, 88 J. POL. ECON.288, 290
(1980); see also William A. Klein, The Modern Business Organization: Bargaining Under Constraints, 91 YALEL.J. 1521, 1521 (1982).
413. Henry G. Manne, Citizen Donaldson, WALLST. J., Aug. 7, 2003, at AIO.
414. See Security Holder Director Nominations, Proposed Rule Release No. 34-48626, 68 Fed.
Reg. 60784 (Oct. 23, 2003).
415. Admittedly, the ideas of representation utilized in medieval political institutions are not
consistent with current notions of representative democracy. This simply shows how the norm of
political legitimacy through representative governing institutions becomes measured against evolving ideas of representation.
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and cultural ideas, 416 and that the idea of consent through elected representatives is so ingrained in our culture that shareholders expect it even
if they do not take advantage of it.

416. For a recent attempt to document statistically the relationship between cultural va lues and
business governance, see Amir N. Licht, The Mother of All Path Dependencies: Toward a CrossC11/t11ra/
Theory of Corporate Governance Systems, 26 DEL. J. CORP. L. 147 (200 I).

